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ABSTRACT

Title of dissertation:

The Validity of Oil Spill Combating Methods: The
Decision Making Process- A Critical Study

Degree:

MSc

The dissertation is a study of the prerequisites of a “correct decision” in cases of oil
spill combating. The decision-makers miss-perceptions are investigated and
identified using several techniques such as case studies, questionnaire as well as
personal interviews.

A comprehensive study is conducted to highlight and discuss the identified technical
miss-perceptions as a foundation for introducing a scientific Decision support tool for
producing a sound decision in cases of oil spills.

The active contribution of oil spill decision-makers in the stages of building up their
national oil spill contingency plans is examined and evaluated. In addition a study is
conducted on the capabilities and limitations of the widely used oil spill modeling
techniques.

The concluding chapters introduce the Oil Spill Management Simulators as a viable
training and assessment tool for oil spill decision-makers. A model structure of a spill
crisis handling simulator is proposed and an investigation of the capabilities and cost
effectiveness of such facilities is conducted. Finally a number of recommendations
are made concerning the need for enhancing the knowledge and competence
standards of oil spill decision-makers.
KEY WORDS: Oil Spill, Decision-Makers, Chemical Combating, Mechanical
Combating, Spill Models, Simulation, Virtual Reality, Training, Assessment, Decision
Support Tool.
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Chapter One
Introduction
In response to a query on maritime law, the emperor Antonius once advised his
fellow Romans that “…I am the lord of the whole…the law is the lord of the sea”. A
similar philosophy can be applied to oil spill emergencies, for they neither respect
national boundaries nor national laws and can impact on anyone and everywhere.

Each time a major oil spill occurs questions are asked about why, decision makers
usually drift away from the right decisions and yet we remain unable to deal with
spilled oil on the surface of the sea and thereby prevent it from fouling beaches and
damaging wildlife and coastal resources. Most of the time the spill incidents are
incorporated with lots of uncertainty. Facing this, the decision makers usually focus
on increasing levels of a detail about something of which there is limited knowledge,
and thereby provide very precise answers that tend to be precisely wrong.

The problem is far more difficult than many people are willing to acknowledge, as
can be illustrated by recent major incidents such as the BRAER off the Shetland
Isles, the SEA EMPRESS in Wales, the NAKHODKA in Japan, the EVOIKOS in the
Malacca strait and the ERIKA and PRESTIGE in the Bay of Biscay. ITOPF oil spill
statistics (see fig.1.1) shows that the average number of large spills (>700 tonnes)
during the 1990s was less than a third of that during the 1970s. Despite such
dramatic reduction and even with the evolution of new oil spill combating
technologies and the billions spent on equipment stock piles by the industry and the
governments as a part of their national contingency plans the decision makers still
receive a black eye at most spill incidents.
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Fig1.1 Quantities of oil spilled
Source: (ITOPF year book p.9)

1.1 Research Objectives

There is no doubt that an adequate knowledge of the fate of various types of oils
under chemical and natural dispersion conditions is essential. Further, the validity of
oil containment and recovery means is most needed. Moreover, the knowledge
about ecological impacts when each method is used is essential. This research will
try to investigate the latter items for decision-makers, and further discusses the
building-up of a scientific supporting tool for oil spill decision makers.

The study will start by discussing the vague areas in oil spill behavior and combating
technologies that decision-makers usually have misconceptions leading to faulty
decisions. Following this the study will try to introduce how the issue of enhancing
the knowledge of such personnel could be approached. Finally the focus will be on
the decision-makers competence and skill element, and what the oil spill
management simulators can achieve in the effective training of current and potential
oil spill management staff.

1.2 Research Methodology
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To achieve the latter objectives the author reviewed a considerable number of spill
cases in the last three decades (see appendix I). The aim was to try to discover
when the decision regarding spill countermeasures went wrong? Why was it wrong?
Was it too late to take the right decision? Why was there a delay? What are the
adverse effects of such delays? Is a lack of knowledge behind this delay or wrong
decisions? Could the lack of skill or experience be the reason for these delays and
faulty decisions? Was the decision in the hands of well-trained competent
personnel?

The cases studied identified some common areas of misperceptions among
decision makers, which are discussed in this study. Moreover a questionnaire was
generated and directed to current and potential decision makers in various
countries. The questionnaire consisted of two sections (see appendix II). The first
section focused on questions about areas in oil fate and spill countermeasures
where decision makers were having a noticeable un-certainty. The second section
was dedicated to how such decision makers view the use of oil spill management
simulators as a training approach, and do their opinions regarding whether they
could contribute in enhancing skill and competence levels?

As the tackled subjects are dynamic and some are still being reviewed and
assessed the search and collection of data focused mainly on recent technical
papers presented to the specialized seminars and conferences. These papers
provide a wealth of the most updated data needed for this research. Various
research institutes having relevant on-going or earlier relevant research were also
contacted where they presented their own expertise and contributed by supplying
some environmental modeling software, which aided in the research process by
displaying their capabilities and their limitations. These models in some cases would
present an acceptable tool for predicting the behavior of oil in various hydrographic
and meteorological conditions. They could also be used to predict the potential bioeconomic impacts providing that accurate data is fed to the model.

The field trips of WMU were utilized to the utmost by a series of discussions and
interviews with all oil spill related staff in all response organizations, classification
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societies, equipment manufacturers and IMO Technical Co-operation Division staff
visited (see appendix III).

1.3 Critical Issues Discussed in the Research

The research discussed why is it difficult to execute the planned measures during oil
spills? Is it because they are extremely rare events with impacts far greater than
those experienced during more routine emergencies? Or is it because the society
does not deal easily with low probability high consequence events?(Harrald, 1989,
p.139). Reviewing causes for major spills we find that accidents are the
overwhelming cause, with groundings and collisions accounting for 63% of the total
during the period 1974-2002 as shown in fig1.2.

Fig.1.2 causes of pollution accidents (ITOPF, 2002)

From the above, some other vital questions arise. How can contingency planners
guard against such un-predictable events? Can this be done by only preparing for
worst-case scenarios? Can Ecological Risk Assessment (ERA) contribute in
upgrading such plans? Can decision makers have a role in the ERA process? Why
is quantifying the net environmental benefits needed before deciding which spill
combating technology is to be used? What are the impacts of oil on biological
resources? What is time curable and what is not? What should be given top priority?
Is it public health or the good image in front of the media? What are the limitations of
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oil spill trajectory models? Are oil spill professionals really dedicated to their duties?
Is oil spill staff trained properly for these duties? What was the basis of their choice?
Can their performance in the middle of an oil spill crisis be assessed? How?

The research will try to answer some of the above-mentioned questions in an
attempt to provide the proposed support tool for oil spill decision makers. The
research will also evaluate the effectiveness of Oil Spill Management Simulators as
a training tool. It should be noted that in the context of this research “Decision
Maker” (DM) means any person who is legally authorized to make a decision in an
oil spill incident ranging from the operational level first responders, on-scene
commanders reaching to management staff. These decisions could be related to
the choice of spill countermeasures, shore line clean-up techniques, protection of
sensitive resources, mobilization and de-mobilization of resources, or even the
leave-alone and monitoring option.
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Chapter Two
Fate of Oil and Bio-Ecological Concerns
2.1 Introduction:

The following chapter will focus on some of the vital data that decision makers
should be aware of; especially areas were there are often some misperceptions
leading to eliminating viable possibilities about fate and behavior of spilled oil and
adverse impacts resulting from such faulty decisions.

2.2 What Should DMs Know?

One of the main areas that decision-makers should be well aware of is the fate of oil
in the marine environment whether it is naturally or chemically dispersed and how
this is affecting the biological resources and the food chain. Decision makers (DMs)
should also bear in mind the concept of net environme ntal benefits where the
potential consequences of spraying dispersants is weighed against the impacts of
leaving the slick untreated. The tradeoffs between impacts should be clearly defined
to decision makers either on shoreline habitats and wild life on the water surface or
on the water column and benthic organisms.

2.3 Behavior of Oil

When oil is accidentally spilled on the marine environment two main types of
transformation processes occur. The first is weathering in which the physical and
chemical characteristics change. The second is a group of processes relating to the
movement of oil. (Fingas, 2001.pp.39-59). This specific behavior is vitally important
to decision makers for knowing what lies ahead of them. For example, if an oil slick
evaporates rapidly, cleanup is less intense but air pollution is a high probability
which may require more stringent safety procedures for personnel dealing with
combating equipment in such volatile atmospheres, on the other hand the main
problem may be that the spill could be carried by surface currents or winds to the
shore and severely affect the wild life and their habitat.
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The weathering process includes spreading, evaporation, emulsification, dissolution,
dispersion, photochemical oxidation, microbial degradation, adsorption onto
suspended particulate materials, sinking and degradation as shown if figure 2.1, The
relationships between these processes and the use of specific response
technologies needs to be well understood in order to estimate and delineate
windows of opportunity for specific clean-up methodologies and technologies.
Maximum environmental and cost benefits are achieved when responders choose
tactics and technologies to fit the windows of opportunity for each technology
(National Research Council, 2002).

Fig 2.1.fate of oil
Source: ITOPF yearbook 2003/2004

2.3.1 Evaporation

This is considered as the most important process decision makers should monitor
closely as it defines what amount of oil would be left on water or on land after a spill.
Evaporation increases flash point, pour point, density and viscosity. If about 40% (by
weight) evaporates, its viscosity could increase by as much as a thousand fold. Its
density could rise by as much as 10% and its flash point by as much as 400%
(Fingas.2001, p.42). Light fuels such as gasoline could be completely evaporated in
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several days while less than 5% of Bunker C is subject to evaporation. The rate of
evaporation is very rapid immediately after the spill then slows down as shown in
fig.2.2.

Fig.2.2 Evaporation Rates of different types of Oil at 150c Source:(Fingas 2001)

2.3.2 Emulsification

Emulsification is the incorporation of water into oil, forming what so called “mousse”.
Figure 2.3 shows the formation process (Lee, 1999, pp.117-126). As oil emulsifies, it
forms stable water in oil emulsion 1, which can include up to 80% water. This
imposes limitations on clean-up technology as it considerably increases the slick
volume (almost tripled). This emulsified slick will need to be recovered and is difficult
to disperse and recover with skimmers. If the spilled oil contains a high asphaltine
and resins content the viscosity can rise up to 800 times higher than the spilled oil
and the emulsion will remain stable for weeks and even months after formation.

1

When the droplet size in emulsified oils have reached a small enough size so that the forces of gravity do not
naturally separate them, the emulsion is termed stable.
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Fig.2.3 Formation of oil emulsions. source: (champ, 2002)

2.3.3 Dissolution

The lower molecular weight aromatics and some of the polar compounds are usually
rapidly dissolved in the water, what enters the water column is less than a fraction of
a percent of oil. Decision makers should note that soluble aromatic compounds are
particularly toxic to fish and other aquatic life. The toxic effects are likely to be more
prominent in protected shallow water areas with gasoline, diesel oil, and light crude
oils.

2.3.4 Natural dispersion

This occurs when droplets of oil are transferred into the water column by turbulence
and wave action in rough seas. The smaller droplets tend to remain in the water
column for a longer time than the larger ones. This process can be significant to the
extent of removing the bulk of oil as in the case of the BRAER in which the high
seas entirely dispersed the whole slick. The dispersible nature of this particular
cargo should be considered.

2.3.5 Sedimentation
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When oil droplets in the water column become denser than water after interacting
with mineral matter in the water it starts depositing on the sea bottom and usually
get covered by other sediments which results in very slow degradation. This is very
harmful to biota, which comes in contact with those sediments, and decision makers
should consider this as a potential threat.

2.3.6 Biodegradation
Many species of bacteria, fungi and yeasts metabolize hydrocarbons to an oxidized
compound, which may be further degraded, may be soluble or may accumulate in
the remaining oil. This process is directly proportional to temperature. Petroleum
products containing higher amounts of aromatics and asphaltine biodegrade slowly.
The existence of oxygen and nutrients such as nitrogen or phosphorus is vital to this
process, because these nutrients are mainly available at shorelines or in land it is
noticed that more biodegradation occurs near coast lines (Nordvik, 1995).

2.4 Where will it go?

Following a spill, the oil tends to spread into a slick over the water surface; this
process is speeded up by the effect of winds and currents. If the oil slick is in coastal
waters with relatively calm winds (less than 10 km/h) the main mover will be the
surface current, as it will move with a rate of 100 % of the surface current and only
about 3% of the wind speed. But if the wind speed gusts to more than 20 km/h in
open waters it takes precedence in determining the slick’s movement, in all cases
both factors should be considered as shown in fig.2.4

Fig.2.4 Effect of wind and currents on the movements of an oil slick (Fingas, 2001)
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2.5 How to predict?

To enhance the effectiveness of clean-up operations, decision makers would need
rapid and accurate tools for predicting not only the direction of the spill with usual
mathematical models plotting spill trajectories but also the changes in oil properties
through a dynamic data base containing data and information on the capabilities,
capacities and limitations of response technologies and methodologies (Engelhardt,
1994.p.17). This would be studied in depth in a following chapter of this research.

2.6 Impacts of natural dispersion of oil spills

Regulators and decision makers often think about impacts from human health
perspective neglecting the potential dangers to biological resources, which may not
be a priority at the time of the spill. However long-term effects could reside in the
environment for years. In this context the study focused on those impacts in the
case of natural dispersion oil or when it is dispersed by means of chemical
dispersants.

2.6.1 Impacts on sea Foods

Seafood contamination can result from the exposure to the dissolved fraction of oil,
dispersed oil or an oil coating. The aromatic fraction of oil poses the greatest
exposure risk, as they are more soluble than other components oil. (Yender et al,
2002, pp.6-8). Table2.1 summarizes the risk of contamination for the five oil groups
commonly encountered by spill responders. For simplicity oils have been grouped
into types with similar properties (similar API gravities2) to assist in recognizing the
potential for seafood contamination when screening a spill incident. As the human
health aspect is always one of the prime concerns to decision makers a sampling
process for commercial harvest should be considered and results should be
compared with reference samples to be able to make statistical inferences to the
entire area. If authorities conclude that eating contaminated fish or shell fish
2

API Gravity is used by the petroleum industry rather than density. It is determined by the following equation: API at
60°F = 141.5/oil density -131.5.
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collected from or around the spill site poses an unacceptable human health risk,
they may issue local fish consumption advisories or harvest closures for specific
water bodies or parts of water bodies and specific species.
Table 2.1 Characteristics of oil types affecting the potential for seafood
contamination (modified from NOAA and API 1994).
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2.6.2 Impacts on sea birds

Sea bird casualties probably attract the greatest public concern; it is often difficult to
assess the bird mortalities resulting from a spill because it was observed that there
is little relation between the size of a spill and the number of sea bird casualties as
shown in table 2.2 For example over 35,000 carcasses were recovered after the
Exxon Valdez spilled 35,000 tones of oil. In the case of Braer only 1500 dead birds
recovered even though the Braer spill (85,000 tons) was almost two and half times
as large as that of Exxon Valdez (Kingston, 2002, p.56).

Table 2.2 comparison of the number of dead seabirds recovered following the Exxon
Valdez and Braer spills (Kingeston, 2002).
Species Group

Alaskan Spill

Shetland Spill

Sea ducks

1440

Mergansers

121

1

Loons

395

14

Grebes

462

0

Heron

1

3

Geese / Swans

9

0

Gulls

696

74

Kittiwakes

1225

133

836

864

3399

0

870

31

20562

220

Other Auks

2174

29

Bald Eagles

125

N/A

Other birds

3152

0

Total

35467

1536

Cormorants
Shear waters
Fulmars
Guillemots / Murres

167
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The high mortality rates are due to the reduction in feather insulating capacity due to
direct oiling allowing cold water penetration and subsequent increase in the of the
thermal conductance. Also records of bird deaths due to direct ingestion of oil exist.
Direct exposure of eggs affects reproduction and has the greatest potential for
damage especially in the early states of incubation. Adults that are exposed to
sublethal doses of oil and then ingest it may produce fewer eggs or cease laying
eggs all together.

2.6.3 Impacts on Coral Reefs
Corals are regarded as the most diverse and complex marine communities (a single
reef may contain 300 species of coral), and play an important role in the
geochemical mass balance of the oceans. Coral reefs are also an important for the
fishery as they provide food and shelter to many species. Coral reefs are also a
barrier for coastal erosion, and their amenity value is often the basis of tourist
economies (IPIECA, 1992, P.4). All these factors should be highlighted to decision
makers.

Laboratory studies on the effects of oil on corals revealed decrease of growth
decrease in reproductive and colonization capacity, and also negative effects on
feeding and behavior. On the other hand a long-term field study of corals in the Gulf
of Aqaba with persistent exposure to oil from nearby terminal operations caused
more detrimental effects than one time exposure even though the one time
exposure is more visible. Chronic oil pollution can make corals more venerable to
natural phenomena. For example data on the re-colonization of a coral reef after a
very low astronomical tide in the Gulf of Aqaba showed that after 10 years the corals
re-established well in a relatively clean environment but those corals on a
chronically polluted beach did not.

2.6.4 Impacts on Salt Marshes
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Salt marches occur along many coasts and fulfill many important functions, which
are not always known. For example salt marches provide nursery areas and food
web support for fish and shellfish. In addition they play an important role in coastal
protection. In some parts of the world they are used by livestock and they are an
important habitat for wading birds. Because of ignorance legislators sometimes deprioritize marches claiming that they are of no human use importance which proved
to be a wrong trend from the lessons learned from marsh oiling in the last two
decades.

The facts are that marsh environments are highly sensitive to oiling and should
receive high priority for protection; if protection fails and marches are oiled, decision
makers should carefully consider the advantages and disadvantages of clean up (as
shown in table 2.3) in this sensitive habitats. A starting point would be assessing the
severity of the impact and attempting to estimate the timeframe for recovery. With
information about the likely timeframe for recovery it is possible to assess whether
cleanup is likely to speedup the natural recovery process or to impede it (Hoff, 1995,
pp.2-5).
Table 2.3 Cleanup techniques used in marshes and their advantages and
disadvantages. Source (Hazmat report 96-2 NOAA)
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2.6.5 Impacts on Mangroves3

Mangroves coastal forests are notorious oil traps, the trees usually die when
coming in contact with oil endangering coastal stabilization and food chain support
for near-shore fisheries. Therefore it is important for decision makers to address
habitat protection options by understanding the adverse effects on these sensitive
plants.

Oil slicks usually enter mangrove forests at high tide and deposits on the aerial
roots, as the tide recedes lots of oil patches are left behind each according to its
own tidal height which makes it very difficult to assess the extent of oiling especially
in dense forests. Aerial surveillance is only useful at a very late stage when the trees
are actually killed by the oil, which could not be visible before 30 days in most
cases.

Response Considerations:
•

Oiled wrack 4 can be removed once the threat of oiling has passed. Wrack
can actually protect the trees from direct oil contact during the acute phase
of the spill.

•

Sorbent booms can be placed in front of oiled forests to recover oil released
naturally.

•

In most cases, no other cleanup activities are recommended.

•

Where thick oil accumulations are not being naturally removed, low-pressure
flushing or vacuum may be attempted at the outer fringe.

•

No attempt should be made to clean interior mangroves, except where
access to the oil is possible from terrestrial areas.

•

It is extremely important to prevent disturbance of the substrate by foot
traffic; thus most activities should be conducted from boats.

3

The term “mangrove” refers to salt-tolerant species of tree or shrub which grow on
sheltered shores and in estuaries in the tropics and some sub-tropical regions.
4
Wrack refers to debris of seaweed and algae washed out with the oil slick.
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It is vitally important that decision makers know that it was proven through field and
laboratory experiments that mangrove trees have the ability to tolerate dispersed oil
better than untreated oil as shown in fig 2.5. Hence considering the use of chemical
dispersion may be an effective measure only after considering all other affected
resources within the context of the contingency plan (IPECA, 1993). The issue of
using chemical dispersants is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

FIG.2.5 Comparison of the toxicity of untreated oil on some mangrove species. The
histogram shows LC50 5 values (in the case of fauna, after 96 hours, in the case of
mangrove saplings after 30 days) the lower the LC50 value the lower the tolerance.
Source ( IPIECA VOL.4,1993).

2.7 The Economic Impacts of Oil Spills

Ideally all those various biological impacts would mainly be transformed later on to
economical

impacts,

posing

the

usual

pressure

on

higher-level

decision-

makers(political masters). However some of the data reaching them could be

5

. LC50 means the lethal concentration, which is an estimate of the concentration of a substance which, within the

specified time (generally 96 hours), kills 50% of the exposed group of test organisms.
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exaggerated while other data could be misinterpreted causing the outcome to be
faulty decisions.

Reviewing the economic implications of the “Sea Empress” spillage in South Wales
as a major spill where over 70,000 tons of oil was lost. How could such a major
disaster translated in to money was always a controversial issue, there is always
some difficulty in establishing a causal relationship between oil spilled and damage
caused to resources that are not owned which is an indirect economic effect. In this
case it was clear that parties who had relied upon the continued availability of the
damaged asset suffered most, those parties include fishermen, owners of fish
processing factories and their employees, and tourist related industries that rely on
recreational attractions of the beach resource (Bryan & Hill 1997).

Another obvious expenditure affecting the economy was the costs of the clean up
operation itself, table 2.4 clarifies such impacts and concluding that the “Sea
Empress” spill have reduced spending by 14.3 million sterling pounds, with the
majority of this impact being on wages incomes. The study also revealed 1100 job
loses in the aftermath of the spill mostly in tourist businesses.
Table 2.3 Estimated direct effects of spillage on the 1996 Pembroke shire 6 spending
in (£m).

Source: (Bryan & Hill, 1997)

6

Pembroke shire is the local county that the port of Milford haven belongs to,
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2.8 Conclusion

It is clear that decision makers have to decide on priorities, but do they have access
to all information needed? Is it clear to them that oil emulsions viscosity may raise
up to 1000 times of the original spilled oil before deciding to use mechanical
recovery systems and deploy skimmers to the spill site? Do they know that
emulsified oil may contain up to 80% of water before deciding on using the in-situ
burning technique? Are they fully aware that the bio-degradation process is
considerably slowed down in higher aromatic oils when taking the leave alone
option?

Moreover when predicting the spill trajectory do they seek meteorological forecasts
and know that gusting winds over 20 knots would be the prime mover of the slick not
the usual idea that current is? Do they really consider how different types of oils
could affect the seafood and public health? Have they justly prioritized salt marches
as more than unused land and guarded against oil reaching any coral reef areas?
Are they able to understand the tidal changes and the increased risk of oil entering
the mangrove forests? Are they ready to use new generations of chemical
dispersants on appropriate spills or still reluctant to do so? Do they still think that
mechanical methods are the golden key in all cases? An attempt to answer and
discuss some of those controversial issues will be discussed in the following
chapters.
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Chapter Three
Chemical Combating Methods: Myths and Mysteries
3.1 Introduction:

In this chapter the author will focus on the facts regarding validity and limitations of
chemical combating methods. The issues concerning common myths and
misunderstandings about oil spill dispersants will also be discussed.

3.2 Chemical Dispersants, the action?

Dispersants are a class of compounds composed of surfactants (surface active
agents) and solvents. The surfactants are the key components of chemical
dispersants; they contain both water and oil compatible constituents that enable the
surfactant molecules to position themselves at the oil-water interfaces, thereby
lowering the interfacial tension and also significantly lowering the energy required to
generate oil droplets in water. This enables the oil slick to breakup into finely
dispersed oil droplets as shown in fig.3.1 (Fiocco & Lewis, 1999).

Fig 3.1 shows dispersion process. Surfactant locating at oil/water interface (1), and
(2) oil dispersed into surfactant –stabilized droplets.
Source: IPIECA Report serious vol.5

20

3.2.1 The Debate?

The first generation of chemical dispersants was clearly toxic to many marine
organisms. In addition they were in some well-studied cases applied under the
wrong conditions, and consequently they usually caused additional damage. This
explains why the ongoing debate on dispersant use usually reaches to the simplistic
view “save the fish or save the birds and shorelines” implying that dispersants favor
sea birds and shorelines whilst threatening fish. In fact the issue is more complex
and there are lots of perception barriers that decision makers need to remove. An
example of arguments that have been used for and against are summarized in table
3.1.

Table 3.1 the dispersant debate
Those opposed to dispersant use

Those in favor of dispersant use

argue:

argue:

- Using dispersants hides the problem

- The problems are enhanced with oil

rather than solving it.

reaching shore lines.

- The addition of chemicals to the

- The toxic effects of oil already exist

environment is undesirable.

even when dispersed naturally.

- Oil will be broken down naturally given

- Natural dispersion almost stops when

enough time.

oil is emulsified.

-

Dispersants

are

an

unreliable

- Dispersants, provided they are applied

technique because they do not always

using the correct technique, are effective

work.

in most cases.

- It is better to remove spilled oil from the - If the oil is spilled, the damage cannot
surface of the sea rather than forcing it

be reversed, but can be minimized by

into the water.

rapid action. The total removal by
mechanical means is rarely feasible.

-Dispersants are toxic; their use causes

- Modern dispersants have low toxicity

the oil to have greater toxic effects than

and do not add measurably to the

if dispersants are not used.

environmental effects caused by the oil
alone.

Source: (modified from Decola., 1999)
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3.2.2 The choice?

A growing number of countries are now approving the use of chemical dispersants
and publishing lists of approved types, however it is noticed that the majority require
the “authorities” approval on case-by-case basis. Table 3.2 summarizes the
dispersants approved by various countries.

Table 3.2 Overview of permitted dispersants in various countries. (Lindgren, 2001)
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The following discussion focuses on scientific evidence that decision makers need
to understand how different resources will be affected by chemically dispersed oil.
There are situations when the use of dispersants can be appropriate and
ecologically beneficial. The question is what are those situations?

3.3 Factors affecting the dispersant use decision

The effectiveness of a dispersant is determined by measuring the amount of oil that
it puts into the water column and comparing it to the amount of oil that remains on
the water surface. Effectiveness is influenced by the answers of the next three key
questions that decision makers should ask.

3.3.1 Is this type of oil dispersable?

The information needed to answer this question would be whether the type, viscosity,
and weathering characteristics of oil would aid in the dispersion process or not. Oils
containing large amounts of saturate, such as diesel oil, disperse more effectively,
while oils containing high amounts of resigns, asphaltines and waxes will disperse
poorly and will only separate to some degree and may remain on the surface
(Fingas, 2001).

3.3.2 Is dispersion acceptable in these environmental conditions?

The information needed to answer this question relates directly to conducting a net
environmental benefit analysis (NEBA) to weigh the advantages and disadvantages
of dispersant spraying in relation to the location of a spill and the existence of
sensitive resources (Lunel, et al.1997). In conducting such analysis many factors
need to be considered for example:
•

The concentrations of dispersed oil in the water column after application of
dispersants.

•

The toxicity of the likely concentrations of dispersed oil to local flora and
fauna.
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•

The distribution, fate and biological effects of the oil if it is not treated with
dispersants.

•

The amount of mixing energy needed for effective dispersion.

As a result of such considerations many countries have defined zones along their
coastlines where dispersion use is restricted. This may be based on water depth or
distance from the shore or a combination of both.

3.3.3 Is dispersion feasible?

The information needed to answer this question is related directly to the quantity of
oil spilled and the available dispersant. Another important factor would be the
available spraying systems ranging from boat-based systems to helicopters and
fixed wing specialized aircraft.

3.4 What has been done to date?

In order to answer the latter key questions, extensive research work has been done
either by laboratory testing or field experiments in an attempt to verify the
effectiveness of chemical dispersants on different types of oils and their biological
and ecological impacts.

3.4.1 Laboratory studies and experiments

a) Generalized dispersants performance test
Comprehensive laboratory tests have been carried out by a number of national
agencies, oil companies etc., in several countries. The purpose of these tests is
to measure the effectiveness of the most commonly approved dispersants world
wide on two types of crude oils – Prudhoe Bay crude oil and south Louisiana
crude oil (EPA, 2001). The test also compared the effectiveness percent with
other lab tests done by the manufacturer. The comparison showed that tests
carried out by the manufacturer generally show a higher effectiveness of the
dispersant than the EPA’s test (table 3.3). The variation in results suggests that
judgment of dispersants is not always so representative.
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Table 3.3 Comparison of the effectiveness (%) of four dispersants on two different
crude oils (Prudhoe Bay Crude Oil and South Louisiana Crude Oil) as found by the
EPA and the manufacturer (EPA, 2001)

Source: EPA 2001

b) Testing of weathering effects
The Environmental Technology Center in Canada has carried out similar laboratory
testing on dispersant effectiveness with a wider variety of oils with the most
commonly used dispersant (Corexit 9500)7. Tests were also carried out oils under
different weathering conditions to track the dispersant performance in each case
(Refer to appendix 4 for a more detailed overview).
The results show a great fluctuation in dispersant effectiveness but clearly reveal
that for weathered oils the effectiveness drops off significantly (Fingas, et al, 2001).
The tests also revealed one very important observation, that this pattern of
effectiveness is oil specific and not correlated with simple oil properties such as
density, viscosity or maximum weathering percentage. This is a point, which should
be closely reviewed by decision makers.

c) Tests on salinity effects

The effects of receiving water salinity on the effectiveness of two oil dispersants
were studied by the University of California. The dispersants chosen were Corexits
9527 and 9500; the dispersants were applied to ten different types of oils with
7

Corexit 9500 is a product of EXXON chemical USA and one of the most widely used dispersants in the marine
environment and approved by the majority of countries allowing the use of chemical dispersion.
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different physical and chemical properties. Test salinities ranged from 0 to 35 ppt,
with the temperature held constant at 150C. Three examples of mean effectiveness
of both dispersants on Forcados, Arabian light and Kuwait crud oils are shown in
figs 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.

Fig.3.2 Mean effectiveness of Corexits 9527 and 9500 on Forcados crude oil.
Arrows denote salinities at which effectiveness of the two agents was significantly
different. source:( Blondina et.al. 1999)

Fig 3.3 Mean effectiveness of Corexits 9527 and 9500 on Arabian light crude oil.
Arrows denote salinities at which effectiveness of the two agents was significantly
different. source:( Blondina et.al. 1999)
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Fig. 3.4 Mean effectiveness of Corexits 9527 and 9500 on Kuwait crude oil.
Arrows denote salinities at which effectiveness of the two agents was significantly
different. source:( Blondina et.al. 1999).

The tests clearly show that performance of both dispersants was significantly
affected by salinity. The best performance was at salinities above 25 ppt, mainly
best at oceanic salinities (33-35 ppt) with sharp declines outside this range being
recorded (Blondina, et al, 1999). It should be noted that this study also
demonstrated that the interaction between receiving water salinity and the ability of
dispersants to enhance petroleum accommodation into the water column could be
both oil and dispersant specific. This implies that in the field, decision makers should
consider the situation on a case-by-case basis.

d) Tests on temperature effects

The US EPA conducted a research as a part of developing a simulation model in
which they used three test oils, South Louisiana Crude Oil (SLC), Prudhoe Bay
Crude (PBC) and Number 2 Fuel oil. The dispersant used was Corexit 9500. The
results clearly show that lower water temperatures increase the viscosity of both the
oil and the dispersant and consequently increase the energy requirement for mixing
the dispersant and oil. Higher water temperatures reduce oil viscosity and increase
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the solubility of dispersants in water (Subhashini, et al, 2003). Table 3.4 shows the
temperature related results of such a test.

Table 3.4

Corexit 9500 Effectiveness at different temperatures.

Source: (EPA 2003)

3.4.1.2 Open field experiments

To verify the results of laboratory studies field trials are essential. Even though faced
with many legal, technical and logistical difficulties some countries like Norway, UK
and the United States have succeeded in carrying out those vitally important field
trials.

a) Dispersant field trials in Norway

These trials were carried out in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea in June 1994.
In this field trial two oil slicks (2x20 m3 of sture blend North Sea crude) were
released. One slick (Tango) was treated with corexit 9500 after 3 and 7 hours
weathering, while the second (Charlie) slick was left as a control. The dispersants
were applied from a helicopter. The spraying was focused on the thick emulsified
parts of the slick with a very low dispersant to emulsion dosage ratio (DER 1:3001:700). The effect was a significant reduction in water content and viscosity of the
emulsion after the first dose. Fig 3.5 presents the lifetime of the treated slick “Tango”
compared to the control slick “Charlie”. The life time of the treated slick was not
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more than 13 hours and no trace was visible on the water surface after this (Daling,
et al, 2002).

Fig 3.6 lifetime of surface oil slick, slick treated with dispersant (Tango) versus
control slick (Charlie). Source: (Daling, et al, 2002)

b) Dispersant field trials in the UK

The trial was carried out in September 1993 in the UK sector of the North Sea. Two
20 ton slicks of medium fuel oil/gas oil mix (50:50 mix) were released; one of them
was sprayed with Slickgone NS (Type III) dispersant by a fixed wing spray aircraft.
The second slick was kept as a control. Another specialized remote sensing air craft
equipped with SLAR (sideways looking airborne radar) and video, Ultra Violet (UV)
and Infra Red (IR) cameras attended the operation for positioning and sensing.

Two tonnes of the dispersant was sprayed onto the slick with dispersant to oil ratio
(DOR) 1:10 at 09:30 (1.5 hours after the release of the slick) during 10 spray runs
along the length of the slick. The slick was monitored for 6 hours and another two
tonnes was sprayed at 16:00 on the oil remaining on the surface of the treated slick.
The first dispersant application showed initially an increased spreading of the
surface slick, followed by a reduction in surface area after the second spraying. By
monitoring the sub-surface oil concentrations it was observed that they were initially
higher under the treated slick than under the un-treated slick. As dilution occurred
over time it was observed that the maximum dispersed oil concentrations under the
treated slick were no higher than under the untreated one (Lunel, 1995).
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The results of such trials clearly give evidence to the decision makers of the
dispersion ratio and the time span needed to disperse medium fuel oils. Also they
show that in open sea and deep waters the increased total volume of oil dispersed
into the sea is distributed over a larger volume of water and diluted over time without
any significant concentrations resulting from the dispersion process. Refer to
appendix 4 for an over view of the results of recent dispersant effectiveness
measurements.

3.4.2 What about dispersants toxicity?

As this is the usual primary question asked by most stake holders, major field and
laboratory experiments were carried out over the years to verify the effects of
chemically dispersed oils on the human food chain and biological resources.

3.4.2.1 Dispersants Toxicity and long-term impacts

One well known long-term field testing program known as the TROPICS study which
started in 1984 by treating sites containing mangroves, sea grasses and coral
environments with either oil or chemically dispersed oil. The long term effects of
different treatments were studied. This experiment was designed to allow
examination of the possible trade offs between impacts on inter-tidal and sub-tidal
tropical ecosystems .The site was studied for two years and revealed that the undispersed oil had major effects on the survival of mangroves and associated fauna,
but relatively minor effects on the sea grass and the coral communities. Chemically
dispersed oil caused declines in the majority of corals, sea urchins and other reef
organisms, reduced coral growth in one species, and had minor or no effects on sea
grasses and mangroves (Knap, et al, 1995.pp.262-270).

The site was revisited after 10 years in 1994. At the oil site (where un-dispersed oil
was added), the additional mortality of mangrove tress was obvious, being only 17%
at the end of short-term studies and reached 46% after 10 years. At the dispersed
oil site the mangroves showed only sub-lethal effects 8. For corals at the dispersed
oil site long-term recovery has progressed as no significant differences between
8

Sub-lethal effects were in the form of root deformations and less growth rates.
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sites were observed. The site was recently visited twice in 2001 & 2002 to confirm
the latest findings; the details have not been published to date. The findings of this
study relating to the chemically dispersed site are summarized in tables 3.5 and 3.6.

Table 3.5 summaries of TROPICS parameters and findings
Habitats Sampled and Tested
Year site sampled

Corals
and

Mangroves
associated

organisms

and

associated Sea grasses

fauna

Major effects
1984-1986

Declines in growth

Minor effects

Minor effects

Minor effects

Minor effects

rates
1996
(10 years after)
2001-2002

Sub-lethal effects
Recovering

rates

of growth
Almost

normal

growth rates

Almost
growth rates

normal Almost

normal

growth rates

Table 3.6 Survival of mangrove trees and seedlings in 18 years of the TROPICS
study.

R=reference site

O= Oiled site

D=Dispersed oil site.

Source (Ward, et al, 2003)

To summarize the outcome of these studies, decision makers should closely
consider the tradeoffs between dispersant use and non-use. It is obvious that
efficient dispersant use saved mangroves from destruction and long-term effects
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due to an oil spill. However, chemically dispersed oil is harmful to corals and
associated fauna in the short run especially in shallow waters (Ward, et al, 2003).

3.5 Chemical Dispersants and Biodegradation, do they match?

The addition of chemical dispersants has been proven to stimulate the microbial
colonization and biodegradation of dispersed oil even at the low nutrient levels. This
finding was the conclusion of a study on the dispersion and biodegradation of
chemically- dispersed weathered Forties Crude Oil under simulated marine
conditions in laboratory microcosms 9 using various types of dispersants (Corexit
9500 – Finasol OSR-51 – Enersperse 1583 – Dasic Slickone LTSW), (Swannell &
Daniel, 1999). The experiment showed that all the dispersants tested promoted high
levels of oil dispersion within the experimental vessels. There was also some
evidence that this stimulation was not only due to an increased bioavailability
(surface area) of the oil, but also due to the composition of the dispersant in terms of
its ability to promote the growth of indigenous hydrocarbon-degrading microorganisms. Moreover, Varadaraj et al. (1995) noted that sorbitan surfactants found
in nearly all chemical dispersants actually supplied nutrients to the micro-organisms
stimulating the whole process.

Decision makers should consider the latter results, which suggest that dispersant
application may have the dual environmental benefit of promoting both oil dispersion
and oil biodegradation. Should these findings be verified in the field it seems that
this will correct some of the misperceptions of chemical dispersants worldwide.

3.6 When, How, and How much to spray?

The basic four methods for dispersant applications are pressurized backpacks,
boats, helicopters and fixed wing airplanes. Each method has its appropriate time
and place for use. Usually availability and cost are the prime factors that decision
makers have to consider. Below is a discussion regarding the benefits and drawbacks of the different methods.
9

Laboratory microcosms are three glass vessels filled with seawater with sampling and air
inlet ports simulating marine conditions.
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3.6.1 Vessels or aircraft?

Dispersant application from vessels is considered outdated and inappropriate for
certain spill situations. The main complaint about vessels is that they are too slow,
both in reaching spills and in treating them. Ross, (1998) argues that this opinion is
biased and invalid in view of current knowledge. The current view which could be
proven with modern remote sensing equipment is that marine spills do not spread
uniformly, they are composed of thick patches (more than 1mm) that contain most of
the spill volume (90% of spill’s volume is contained in 5 to 10% its area) and these
thick patches are surrounded by sheens (about 0.001 to .01 mm).

Decision makers planning for aerial application often assume that oil spills are
uniformly very thin and very large in area so the one-pass concept of the air craft is
enough to do the job. This is lately changing to the multi-pass approach, which
would be the only possible way of completely dosing the thick portions of marine
spills. This could amount to ten to twenty more passes by the aircraft consuming
more fuel and time for repositioning over the thicker areas of the slick. Here
considering the use of vessels would be reasonable. Assuming a 1000m3 spill, the
thick portions would be 0.4 Km2 approximately. A vessel sweeping the slick at 10
knots speed and a spray swath of 25 meters and a dispersant pump capacity of 760
L/min can totally dose a 2-mm thick slick in one pass with the recommended
dispersant to oil ratio (DOR) of 1:20 in an estimate of 50 minutes. This is nearly the
same time needed by aircraft to treat the same spill (Ross et al., 2001 PP.11951201).

One of the most frequently asked questions in dispersant application is whether to
apply it neat or diluted and does this really relate to its effectiveness? To answer this
wide scale laboratory tests were completed by Belore and Ross, (1999) who
evaluated the performance of two dispersants, Corexit 9527 and 9500, on Alaska
North Slope (ANS) crude oil when applied neat and diluted with salt water. The
results indicated that the performance of Corexit 9527 was not affected when diluted
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with water at a ratio of 1:10. On the other hand the performance of Corexit 9500 on
ANS crude was significantly reduced when applied diluted with water. Fig. 3.6
shows the results from two sets of experiments, one in which the dispersant was
first diluted then sprayed onto the test slick (premix case) while the other was
injected into the main water flow. The results still proved a reduced effectiveness to
Corexit 9500.

Fig.3.6 effects of dilution on dispersant effectiveness
Source (Ross et al., 2001)

This result clearly advises the decision makers to consider which types of
dispersants they should use in relation to the application method. Many countries
lack the existence of specialized spraying vessels or aircraft and instead use service
tugs or supply vessels which usually utilize their fire and foam nozzles and diluting
the dispersant may result in the failure of the whole operation.

3.7 Conclusion: To spray or not to spray?

“Are we going to add more chemicals to the environment?... we don’t want to hide
the problem we need to solve it…. ! No these dispersants are very toxic they will
destroy all our fisheries industry ….. No we are not using dispersants again, we did
that before and it didn’t work.”
These are some of the comments usually heard in the central operations room of a
major spill incident, but the trend is changing and this is due to the following facts:
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•

Some oils are dispersable others are not (oil specific pattern of
effectiveness).

•

Fates of different types of oils differ, each should be investigated separately.

•

The petroleum accommodation into the water column can be both oil and
dispersant specific, which forces decision makers to consider each case
separately.

•

Cold water conditions significantly reduce the dispersant effectiveness as it
increases the viscosity of both the oil and the dispersant.

•

The possibility of the formation of lethal concentrations of dispersants in the
water column is very remote in open waters.

•

The dispersants would have negative impacts on corals initially but long-term
recovery is possible while its impact on mangroves, associated fauna and
sea grass is minimal.

•

The biodegradation process is promoted by the introduction of dispersants.

•

Neat and proper dispersion methods bring more success to the outcome of
the dispersion process.

What if the final decision is not to use chemical dispersion? Or use in combination
by all other available means. This is discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter Four
How to Contain? And can we Recover?
4.1 Introduction:

This chapter will try to focus on the means of improving oil containment and
recovery in the marine environment, how to protect sensitive shorelines and the
practical tools to enhance the quantity of recovered oil. It will also tackle the in- situ
burning option, the use of sorbent materials and when they could be used.

4.2 Mechanical Equipment performance sheets. Do they tell us the truth?

The Mechanical response to oil spills has always had its limitations; the recovery
equipment recording, at best, 30% of the initially spilled oil. However, after the Erika
spill in December 1999, off the coast of Brittany, France, where about 10,000 m3 of
heavy fuel oil spilled into the ocean, less than 5% was recovered at sea before the
oil reached the coast (Hvidbok, 2001, pp. 577-584).

Decision makers tend to go for politically attractive “performance sheets” of
mechanical containment and recovery equipment. For example “Heavy duty Booms”
which can be extremely large reaching up to three meters, which incorporates all
sorts of problems for transport, deployment and towing? Another example could be
“Recovery capacity of the skimmer (250 m3/h)”, but for which type of spilled oil?
Which viscosity? Can this happen in all weather conditions? Similar equipment has
found its way to the inventories of many response organizations. The need to review
the performance limitations of mechanical equipment remains pending and the work
is still in progress.

4.3 Performance of Oil Containment Booms

There is no doubt that the handling and deployment of booms are still far from
satisfactory. Their effectiveness is still considered very limited, even in normal ocean
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environments. The main problem areas are largely in the fast flowing waters10
represented by entrainment of oil, drainage failures and planning of booms resulting
in the potential failure of the containment, Protection or diversion operation. For
these reasons a large number of tests and research papers have been conducted
from 1975 to 1999 resulting in substantial amounts of literature. About 30 papers
were reviewed and summarized lately by Schulze & Lane (2001) in an attempt to
provide data predictive of boom performance for spill decision makers.

4.3.1 Main problem areas of boom performance:

a) Entrainment and Drainage of oil

The first signs of oil escape can be usually noticed when oil droplets starts surfacing
on the water at the backside of the boom. The typical movements of the oil droplets
separated from the oil layer are shown in fig.4.1. The droplet, “a” which is larger in
size and higher in buoyancy, tends to float and reattaches itself to the oil layer
above. Droplet “b” will be carried downstream and passing below the skirt of the
boom. Droplet “c” is carried towards the boom, undergoes a circulatory motion for a
while and eventually escapes beneath the boom. Such a leakage behavior is called
entrainment failure. When this stream increases the entrainment will turn to a
continuous drainage resulting in the loss of large amounts of contained oil (Lee &
Kang, 1997).

Fig. 4.1 typical behaviors of oil droplets separated from an oil slick blocked by an oil
boom. Source: (Lee & Kang, 1997).

10

Any water mass velocity in excess of 1 knot is considered fast flowing water for boom performance
testing.
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The question is when is this downstream formed and why? This stream is mainly
because of the movement of water mass either by the currents and tidal streams
or by the reverse current resulting from towing the boom in the water.

b) Splash over

This usually occurs in high seas when the waves are higher than the boom’s
freeboard so the contained oil on one side of the boom is able to splash to the
other side as shown in fig.4.2

c) Submergence failure

This is one of the common failures and it occurs when water goes over some
types of booms which are not buoyant and flexible enough to follow the wave
motion so some of the boom length could occasionally sink and oil passes over
it as shown in fig.4.2

d) Critical accumulation

This failure usually occurs with heavier oils, which tend to accumulate close to
the leading edge of the boom and are swept underneath with the increase of
current velocity as shown in fig. 4.2

e) Planning

Is a sign of mishandling or miss positioning. It occurs when the boom moves
from the vertical to almost a horizontal plan allowing the oil to pass over or under
it as shown in fig.4.2. This usually occurs if the boom is towed creating reverse
currents in excess of the recommended velocities.
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Fig.4.2 Boom failure modes. Source: (Fingas, 2001)

4.3.2 Uses of Booms

One of the key solutions for overcoming these failures is that the decision makers
should change the conventional thought that Booms are only used to contain the oil
slick in open waters. The Other alternative uses have proved to be more successful
with less failure rates, namely:

a) Deflection booming

This is better used where the currents are likely to exceed 1 knot. The boom
should be carefully deployed at a certain angle to the current according to the
current’s speed as recommended in table 4.1. Placing the boom at the wrong
angle for the current speed and improper anchoring causes the boom to sag and
a pocket forms. The pocket orients perpendicular to the flow at the point of
highest current speeds, and usually results in boom failure (see fig. 4.3).
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Table 4.1 Boom angles and critical current velocities.

Source: Fingas 2001

Currents & Angles
Current velocity (knots)
current

6
5
4

Boom angle
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Fig. 4.3 currents and recommended boom angles.
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b) Exclusion booming

Exclusion booming is effective only where the currents are relatively weak;
otherwise entrainment under the boom is likely. Even so, deflection booming can
be added as a backup in come cases. Multiple booms should be used to ensure
effectiveness. It is imperative that the boom is well sealed to the shoreline to
prevent leakage. Figure 4.4 shows examples of deflection and exclusion
booming.

Fig. 4.4 Examples of deflection and exclusion booming configurations
Source: Michel et al. 1994

c) Cascading pattern

If the existence of strong currents prevents the proper positioning of the booms,
several booms can be deployed in a cascading pattern towards areas of weaker
currents for enhanced recovery as shown in fig 4.5. In this type of configuration
decision-makers should prepare for the following:
•

There must be adequate overlap between boom sections so more
length of boom sections will be required.

•

The booms may need securing with multiple anchors to guard
against strong currents.

•

Sites for collection along the shore must have access for
personnel and equipment.
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•

Anchoring points, collection sites, and boom configuration will
change with shifts in tidal current and wind directions, and so
must be regularly tended ( Michel et al.1994)

Fig.4.5 Cascade to collection points. Source: Michel et al. 1994

4.3.3 Improving boom performance

Knowing the limitations in boom performance, the key elements in avoidance of
boom failure is choosing the right type of boom, in the right configuration and always
considering the state of the sea and currents in the deployment area. The analysis
of the previously mentioned 31 tests also supports the decision makers by high
lighting that the factors contributing to better performance are either dynamic or
physical.

The dynamic factors relate to the towing speed or the currents affecting the
stationary booms. They reveal that:
•

Booms can be towed in the catenary 11 mode in calm water up to 0.9
knots without losing oil. This performance is reduced to 0.7 knots in short
regular waves or harbour breaking waves.

11

Catenary mode refers to towing by two boats in a U or J configuration.
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•

In the diversionary mode and Vee sweep, towing speeds can be up to
1.2 knots and in some cases 2 or 3 knots without oil loss (Schulze &
Lane, 2001 pp.285-293).

The most important physical factors that affect boom performance appear to be the
following:
•

The buoyancy to weight ratio or reserve buoyancy. This means that the
float must balance the weight of the boom with the force exerted by
currents and waves. The higher this reserve buoyancy the better the
ability of the boom to rise and fall with the waves and remain on the
surface of the water.

•

The heave response, which is the boom’s ability to follow the wave
patterns. It is indicated by both the reserve buoyancy and the flexibility of
the material of the boom structure. A boom with a good heave response
will move with the waves on the water surface and not submerge
alternately and thrust out of the water due to wave action.

•

The roll response, which is the booms ability to remain upright with the
least roll over movements. This is related directly to the design of the
boom’s tension member12 (Fingas, 2001.pp.73-83).

4.4 Oil Skimmers: How effective are they?

Recovering oil on the water is mainly done with skimmers. It would appear to be an
easy task to recover floating oil; in fact it is one of the most difficult operations to
perform. It is true that effective recovery leaves less oil to be deposited on the
shoreline but the task usually faces many obstacles, one of which is that skimming
oil off the water surface frequently collects large amounts of water, which increases
the volume of the waste to handle and dispose. Another obstacle which was clearly
demonstrated in past oil spill experiences (Exxon Valdez, New Carrisa, Erika) is the

12

Tension member is usually a galvanized chain or wire attached to the bottom of the boom to
withhold the tension forces exerted on the boom in operation. It also acts as a ballast weight helping in
keeping the boom floating upright at all times.
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lack of ability to handle high viscosity oil. Failing to be able to transfer high viscosity
recovered oil may be due to a limited understanding of the recovered oil viscosity
influence on the pressure losses in the transfer system. This brings us back to the
decision-maker’s perception of the skimmer capacity and the efficiency of their
performance.

4.4.1 Skimmer selection: one step ahead

Skimmers are classified in five different categories: weir, suction, centrifugal,
submersion, and sorbent or oleophilic 13 skimmers. Key factors in selecting
appropriate skimmers are the amount of debris present, the viscosity of the oil, the
water depth and most important of all are the weather and sea conditions at the time
of potential use (IMO, 1988).

4.4.2 Which skimmer? At what time? In which kind of oil?

a) Weir Skimmers

Weir skimmers with built-in transfer pumps for high viscosity oils are probably
the most widely used skimmers for open sea skimming. They are based simply
on gravity to drain the oil from the surface of the water to the weir well and to the
holding tank. But what happens when they are actually deployed to recover oil?
•

Responders tend to push or even shovel oil sludge into the hopper
causing the pump to clog if it encounters any tar balls or debris.

•

In swell and waves this skimmer tends to rock back and forth sucking air
above the slick and water below which increases the amount of water,
resulting in the rapid filling of the holding tank.

13

Oleophilic materials are having greater affinity to oil than to water.
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•

Weir skimmers start losing efficiency when the viscosity of oil exceeds
30,000-40,000 cSt. It becomes almost impossible for the oil to pass the
weir lip and flow to the hopper. Therefore other types of skimmers or
recovery equipment should be used if the viscosity reaches these levels.

b) Suction or vacuum skimmers

This skimmer is only a suction head connected to an external source of a vacuum,
such as a vacuum truck. It also tends to be susceptible to the same problems as
weir skimmers, but despite this its compactness and shallow draft allows it to
operate efficiently in shallow waters and confined areas.

c) Mechanical feeder skimmers

Mechanical feeding could be achieved by various means such as:
1. A set of ropes, bristles or brushes, gravity / scrapper feeding to a pump or a
tank.
2. Various open or closed structure inclined belt types that convey the oil to a
scraper, which gravity feeds into a tank or a pump.
3.

Rotating a stretch metal net drum “snail shell” feeding by the concentrating
geometry of the stretch into an oil trap, which, feeds into a pump.

4. Twin counter rotating drums with positive guides that lift and pressurescraper feed the oil into a trap, which feeds a pump.
5. Conveyor belt with flap cups which gravity dumps into a tank or pump(fig 4.6)
6. Rotating discs with corrugated or rough teeth at the perimeter of the discs,
gravity/scrapper feeding to a pump.
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Belt
collecting
oil to
storage

Fig. 4.6 mechanical belt skimmer
The above listed types were the best in performance in the field for highly viscous
oils. Their ability to recover is based on combinations of adhering, grabbing, trapping
and squeezing dependant on the type of oil being collected. They also are not
sensitive to debris and in most cases recover minimal amounts of water even in
choppy weather conditions. Decision makers should focus on one vital factor, which
is the transfer pump’s performance and its ability to pump the recovered oil and
debris to storage. This may require the pumps discharge to be equipped with an
additional lubricating system or a complete viscous oil pumping system (VOPS14),
which greatly enhances the skimmer performance (Hvidbak, 2001).

D) Oleophilic Surface Skimmers

These types usually use an oleophilic surface to which oil can adhere. This surface
may take the form of a disc, drum, belt, brush, or rope (see fig 4.7). The surface
itself could be steel, aluminum, fabric or plastics such as polypropylene or polyvinyl
chloride.

14

This equipment consists of a water injection flange with a water injection pump, hydraulic hoses,
fittings, hard pipe with pressure gauge and 400 meters of hydro tested six inch oil transfer hose.
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Oleophilic disc

Disc

Mop

storage

Fig.4.7 Oleophilic Rope Skimmer (Mop skimmer) & Disc Skimmer
These skimmers have high oil to water recovery ratio hence they work best with light
crude oils and are well suited to working in waves and among weeds and debris. A
summary of the operating range of various types of skimmers in relation to oil
viscosity is shown in fig 4. 7.

47

Mechanical
Vacuum
Oleophilic
Weir
0

1,000

5,000
10,000
Viscosity (cSt)

Solid

Fig.4. 7 Operating Range of Skimmer types

4.5. In Situ- Burning (ISB): when will it work?

Successful In- situ burning can remove oil from the water surface very efficiently and
at very high rates in ideal conditions. Removal efficiency of thick slicks can easily
exceed 90%. Removal rates of 2000 m3/h can be achieved with a fire area of only
about 100 m in diameter. The use of a towed fire containment boom to capture,
thicken and isolate a portion of a spill, followed by ignition is in most cases less
difficult than the operations involved in mechanical recovery, storage, treatment and
disposal (Buist, 1999. pp. 21-28). However the success of ISB has a limited window
of opportunity defined by two sets of factors relating to the characteristics of the oil,
and the environmental conditions.

a) Thickness of the slick

The concentrating and thickening of the slick is vital during the ISB operation.
The thickness of the oil must be maintained to avoid a heat sink effect that

48

transfers the heat from the oil layer to the water and extinguishes the fire.
Minimum thicknesses include two to three millimeters for fresh crude oil, three to
five millimeters for diesel and weathered crude, and five to ten millimeters for
emulsions and bunker C.

b) Flash point of the spilled oil

The flash point is the lowest temperature at which ignitable vapors are formed
which is capable of flaring up from an outside ignition source. Highly volatile oils,
such as gasoline products with flash points near 400C, evaporate quickly which
lessens the chances for a successful ISB as the slick ages. Heavy crude oils
and residual products are only slightly volatile, with flash points greater than
650C and thus once ignited and flames start spreading will stand a better chance
for a successful operation (Yoshioka et al. 1999 pp.2-19).

c) Emulsification formation

Emulsification of an oil spill negatively affects in situ ignition and burning. This
is because of the water in the emulsion. Stable emulsion water contents are
typically in the 60% to 80% range with some up to 90%. The oil in the emulsion
cannot reach a temperature higher than 100 °C until the water is either boiled
off or removed. This results in the significant decline in the burn rates of the
slick which is summarized in the following:
•

little effect on oil removal efficiency (i.e., residue thickness) for
low water contents up to about 12.5% by volume;

•

a noticeable decrease in burn efficiency with water contents
above 12.5%, the decrease being more pronounced with
weathered oils; and

•

Zero burn efficiency for stable emulsion slicks having water
contents of 25% or more.

Recent research carried out in US, UK and Norway on the addition of chemical
emulsion breakers on the emulsified slicks to extend the window of opportunity
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of ISB prior to ignition shows great promise (Thornbourg, 1997.pp131-136 and
Guenette et al.1995.pp 115-123). It resulted in a strong evidence that the
technique is highly oil specific and surfactant dependant. Another recently
completed study of emulsion burning with Alaskan oils is summarized below
(see table 4.1) to illustrate the potential for chemical treatment to extend the
window of opportunity for in situ burning and the challenges remaining. Four oils
were selected for an initial set of laboratory test burns (40 cm diameter) and the
mid-scale (1.7 m diameter) burn tests. They were also subjected to various
weathering conditions in conjunction with the ISB process in an attempt to
simulate field conditions.

Table 4.2 Efficacy of emulsion breaker addition summary

Source: (Buist, 1999. pp.21-28)

It is clear from Table 4.2 that the efficacy of emulsion breaker addition in extending
the limits of ignition and efficient burning appears to be oil related. Its use extends
the limits for some oils but only had marginal effect on others. It is equally clear that
some initially non-ignitable emulsions, due to their high water content are
successfully ignited and burned easily. It is important to note that in one of the labscale burns, manually mixing the emulsion breaker chemical was found to be
somewhat more effective than the natural mixing of the emulsion breaker with wave
action alone. This indicates that the mixing energy supplied either manually or by
the waves was necessary for the chemical to work (Buist, 1999).
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d) Location of the spill

Each location can affect the feasibility of ISB in different ways. An offshore spill may
pose minimum health and safety concerns, but would require containment of the
slick and generally would involve more severe wind and wave conditions. Near
shore wind and wave conditions may be more favorable than offshore conditions,
but burning may be less suitable because of nearby populated areas. Many
governments have delineated zones where burning is pre-authorized; these
formalities will also affect the possible timeliness of an ISB operation.

The results from other laboratory investigations where 17 different types of crude
oils were studied are shown in table 4.3. the oils were categorized according to their
API gravity.

Table 4.3 summary of burn results by group.

Source: (McCourt et al.2001)

The oils in the first group, with API gravities = 38° were found to be very good
candidates for ISB. They only formed unstable emulsions after extensive weathering
processes, thus no emulsion breakers were needed. Ignition was possible even at
high degrees of evaporation and emulsification. In the second group (API between
33-35), which is slightly heavier, the weathering took place for a day or two before
stable emulsions were formed. These emulsions still ignited well after adding
emulsion breakers.

The third group (API between 23-30) behaved erratically; some oils exhibited a high
tendency to form stable emulsions but responded to breakers while others did not.
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The oils in the final group, with API gravities = 21°, were the heaviest tested. They
all proved to be poor candidates for ISB as they formed very stable unbreakable
emulsions, even when they were fresh. No recommended further testing is to be
done to those types (McCourt et al.2001 pp.529-532).

4.6 Oil Sorbents. How much can they absorb? Are they safe?

During many oil spills Sorbents are often used in the clean-up process as a first
line of defense, the questions raised are: which type of Sorbent materials are they?
Of what origin? Are there any Ecotoxicology tests carried out on such types? How
much can they absorb? How are they going to be handled after getting soaked with
oil? Where are they going to be disposed of?

Sorbent means essentially inert and insoluble materials that are used to remove oil
from water through adsorption, in which the oil is attracted to the Sorbent surface
and then adheres to it (see fig. 4.9 a) or by absorption, in which the oil penetrates
the pores of Sorbent material ( see fig.4.9 b) or a combination of two. Sorbents are
generally manufactured in particulate form for spreading over an oil slick or as
sheets, rolls, pillows or booms. Sorbents are generally not listed among hazardous
substances in many countries. However, Sorbents containing chemical or biological
components, especially when made in lose form, may pose an ecological threat.
Decision makers should consider the massive change in sorbent material weight
after use. Moreover the oil retention capacity of absorbent versus adsorbent
materials must be also considered to be prepared for the appropriate means of
waste disposal.

Care should also be taken from leaving sorbent materials in temporary storage sites
for long periods of time. This could cause the breakup of the containing material
resulting in the spread of the particulate which may have toxic effects on some
habitats in the surrounding environment.
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Oil Adheres to the surface fibers
Fig.4.9 a . Adsorbent Material

Oil absorbed into the material
FIG.4.9 b Absorbent material.
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some examples of sorbent materials that are mainly from organic origin ( peat moss,
bird feathers). Sorbent materials of mineral origin are for example volcanic ash and
vermiculite. These materials do not pose high contamination threats. However
caution should be taken when using Sorbent materials containing nonindegenous
microbes, chemical solidifiers and synthetics such as polypropylene and polyester
(Nichols, 2001 pp.1479-1843). The oil retention capacities of various Sorbent
materials are summarized in table 4.4.

Table 4.4 Retention capacities of Sorbent materials

Oil retention capacities

Sorbent

Diesel Crude Oil

Natural
Natural Peat Moss
Straw
Saw Dust

5
4
3

8
4
4

Mineral
Perlite / Vermiculite

5

4

Synthetic
Polyurethane Foam
Polyethylene Wool
Polyethylene Sheets

73
37
19

73
24
15

HFO
7
2
3

3

49
16
11

Source: Environment Canada

Grams Oil per Gram Sorbent
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4.7 Conclusion

By reviewing this chapter, it is clear that decision makers have some vital points to
consider, have some actions to take and other actions they should refrain from
doing. These are:
•

Do not take the literature about performance rates of mechanical equipment
for granted unless they investigate how they perform under actual working
conditions in the field.

•

They have to keep in mind that entrainment of oil under booms may occur at
very low current or towing speeds (as low as 0.7 knots) in order to prepare
for alternative deployment patterns which might need the extra length of
boom sections to achieve a more successful operation.

•

They must consider that booms once deployed at sea, should be tended at
all times, especially when the tide and winds are changing.

•

When deploying booms out in the open sea, decision makers usually
choose the rigid stiff types of booms thinking they are the best for adverse
weather conditions. This disregards the vital buoyancy to weight ration factor
and is likely to result in the partial failure of the operation.

•

During skimming operations, decision makers should not only know the
viscosity of the spilled oil but also the emulsion’s viscosity as the time lapses
in order to prepare and deploy the type(s) of skimmer and associated
pumping systems capable of handling such viscous oils.

•

If an ISB decision is taken, spill mangers should instruct the crew on site
(OSC) to focus on concentrating the slick with fire booms for a successful
ignition and burning operation with the least residues.

•

The growing promising signs of effectiveness of the addition of emulsion
breakers in case the ISB equipment and crew cannot reach the site in the
early stages of the spill should be considered by the decision makers.

•

Decision makers should also bear in mind that a considerable amo unt of
energy would be needed to fully mix such emulsion breakers with the slick
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(by wave action or manually) to gain better ignition and a continued burning
process.
•

If sorbent materials are to be used their type and origin must be known. The
location of use must also be considered as some types pose imminent
ecological threats. In addition sorbents usually result in a massive amounts
of bulky waste which needs to be disposed of.

The Decision makers, by knowing those technical limitations of various combating
methods, can be prepared for the introduction of a decision supporting tool
integrating all the input data to better handle the crisis. This tool can NOT be utilized
effectively if there are misperceptions or a lack of knowledge about the limitations of
technical oil spill countermeasures. This decision-making supporting tool in the
context of a complete crisis management system will be discussed in the following
chapter.

56

Chapter Five
The Decision Making Process
5.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the process of formulating a sound decision. What are the
prerequisites needed? What information could be offered to decision makers during
a spill crisis? In what form is the information offered? Can the flow of information be
integrated in a user-friendly software package? Can decision makers handle the
complex flow of data and benefit from it?

5.2 What should be already on the table?

Most countries have already developed their own National Oil Spill Contingency
Plans. However, in many cases such contingency plans are not updated and
integrated with the available response capabilities. Frequently these plans fail to
incorporate the most likely scenarios into the crisis management components. As an
example the environmental risks for oil spill response are frequently not assessed.
Furthermore a balanced, readable, and real-time risk communication to support
decision-making is frequently lacking. Obviously there is a need for a scientifically
based decision making tool which identifies and defines the windows of opportunity
and effectiveness of different response methods and technologies (equipment) for
specific oils under given environmental conditions considering a multitude of
changing factors including, for example, the weathering of oil following the spill.

This scientifically based tool should be able to integrate oil spill trajectory models
with environmental risk assessment with the Windows concept all together and
provide policy decision makers with recommendations for how and when response
methods should be used (Ornitz & Champ, 2002. pp.279-288). In order to build such
tools the blocks needed to complete the full construction will be developed and
collected from various sources:
•

Existing National Oil Spill Contingency Plans (NOSCPs)

•

Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA) analysis data
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•

Net Environmental Benefit Analysis data (NEBA)

•

Historical meteorological data (prevailing winds and currents)

•

Local tidal patterns and weather forecasts for input to trajectory models

•

Data about weathering rates of different oils and the resulting changes in
physical properties

•

Available combating equipment and technologies

•

Location of stockpiles of different types of equipment and material of
relevance for successful combating

•

Estimated timing for deployment of equipment at different sites

•

Remote sensing facilities available

•

Oil weathering model (prediction of changes in oil properties for oils
commonly transported in the area)

From the list above it is obvious that this database needs to be dynamic and require
constant

updating.

In

addition,

decision

makers

should

keep

themselves

knowledgeable in most of its vital elements to be able to use it as an effective tool in
spill response. One approach could be that they can actively contribute in carrying
out the risk assessments and quantifying environmental benefits for their own
countries along with the specialized risk assessors. This will give them better
perception of risk and a wider understanding of the influence of how environmental
conditions and changing physical conditions affect biological and socio-economic
resources (Petersen, 1996, pp. 223-245). In the following sections more light will be
shed on the main elements of these scientific tools and how decision makers could
contribute actively in building up the database required.

5.3 Ecological Risk Assessment (ERA): The Role of Decision-Makers

ERA is a process that evaluates the likelihood that adverse ecological effects may
occur or are occurring as a result of exposure to one or more stressors. The process
is used is mainly used to evaluate and organize data, information, assumptions and
uncertainties in order to help understand and predict the relationships between
stressors and ecological effects in away that is useful for environmental decision
making (US. EPA, 1998 PP. 17-28). This assessment process(s) may involve
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chemical, physical or biological parameters as discussed in earlier chapters of this
paper. One or more parameter could be considered at the same time. The process
is usually conducted in three phases: problem formulation, analysis, and risk
characterization. The question here would be what is the role of decision makers in
such a process?

The first step is to build up a team composed of both decision makers and risk
assessors to provide the necessary breadth of expertise. The decision makers
charged with protecting the environment can identify information they need to
develop their decision while risk assessors can ensure that science is effectively
used to address ecological concerns, and together they can evaluate the
assessment and address identified problems. As the assessment process
approaches its end point some vital questions have to be exchanged between
decision makers and risk assessors.

Questions principally for risk assessors to ask decision makers are:
• Are the risks sufficiently well defined to support a risk management decision?
• Was the right problem analyzed?
• Was the problem adequately characterized?
(Adapted from U.S EPA, 1993 & Barnthouse and Brown, 1994)

Questions principally for decision makers to ask risk assessors:

• What effects might occur?
• How adverse are the effects?
• How likely is it that effects will occur?
• When and where do the effects occur?
• How confident are you in the conclusions of the risk assessment?
• What are the critical data gaps, and will information be available in the near future
to fill these gaps?
• How could monitoring help evaluate the results of the risk management decision?
(Adapted from U.S EPA, 1993 and Barnthouse and Brown, 1994)
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Decision makers contributing actively in ERA would be able to tightly couple the
results reached to the contingency measures. Until recently the identification of high
risk has not lead to major changes in preparedness concepts or adjustment of
activity plans. Lately, however, contingency plans have been refined and
redesigned, and the preparedness systems have been focused towards periods or
geographic areas with increased risk, and priority resources. ERA thus forms the
decision basis and provides the documentation for allocation of contingency efforts
(Jodestol et al. 2001. pp.155-165).

The wide use and important advantages of ecological risk assessments do not
mean they are the sole determinants of management decisions. Decision makers
facing legal mandates and political, social and economic considerations may lead
them to make decisions that are more or less protective. Reducing risk to the lowest
level may be too expensive or not technically feasible. Thus, if ERA is
complemented

by

another

methodology

that

can

accommodate

those

considerations we can get one more step closer to a sound decision.

5.4 Net Environmental Benefit Analysis (NEBA)

The ideal complimentary methodology to ERA would be the Net Environmental
Benefit Analysis (NEBA). NEBA is increasingly used as a framework to assess the
environmental benefits and disadvantages of a chosen response action. This
analysis can be used to account for political and economic impacts as well as the
effects on the natural environment (Lunel & Baker, 1999). If it is meant to be used
after oil is stranded on the shore line the net environmental benefits would be the
gains in environmental services or other ecological properties attained by
remediation or ecological restoration 15, minus the environmental injuries caused by
those actions (Efroymson, et al 2003).

15

Restoration, as defined here, refers to actions that directly improve ecological services or other
ecological properties. Ecological restoration encompasses restoration, rehabilitation, replacement or
acquisition of the equivalent.
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The elements (framework) of an effective NEBA as described by Baker (1999)
includes but is not limited to: (see fig.5.1)
•

Collection of information on ecology, physical characteristics and human use
of environmental resources. (planning stage)

•

Review of spill case studies that are relevant to the combating or remediation
method being assessed.

•

Prediction of likely environmental outcomes.

•

Comparison of advantages and disadvantages of remediation and natural
attenuation. (characterization of reference state)

•

Balancing the advantages and disadvantages to proposed alternatives to
arrive at a decision on the optimum combating or clean up response.

In this last point the contribution of decision makers is inevitable. The reason is that
NEBA is a lengthy process, it takes time, which may be available if the oil has
already impacted the shoreline, but definitely not available for typical coastal slicks
scenarios (e.g. a slick moving over shallow water towards a tourist resort area or a
mangrove swamp). In this case it is important to use NEBA as far as possible during
the contingency planning process, before a spill occurs. The actions in every oil spill
scenario will have to be re-evaluated, or adapted to the time of the spill, taking into
consideration real time conditions. Now we can imagine what will happen if decision
makers find themselves in the middle of the crisis having to adapt a plan or consider
alternatives they never contributed in planning for in the first place!
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Fig 5.1 Frame work for Net Environmental Benefit Analysis
Source: Efroymson, et al 2003

The next step in the building up of the scientific decision support tool would be
ensuring that a valid system of risk communication and crisis communication exists
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and all the data needed is available to all stake holders including, the decision
makers within a real-time status.

5.5 Risk Communication and Crisis communication: Which Comes First?

Stressful situations of concern involving risk can produce barriers to effective
communication and evoke strong emotions such as fear, anxiety, distrust, outrage,
helplessness and frustration. In this environment the traditional approaches for
communications may fall short or even worsen the situation, making necessary the
use of risk and communication techniques (Roth, 2003 pp.1-10).

5.5.1

Risk communication

Risk communication is defined as: an interactive process of exchange of information
and opinions among individuals, groups and institutions. It involves multiple
messages about the nature of risk and other messages, not strictly about the risk,
that express concerns, opinions, or reactions to risk messages or to legal and
institutional arrangements for risk management” (US National Research Council,
1989). An informal survey conducted by a team consisting of representatives of
almost all stake holders shows that individuals or groups who make decisions about
oil

spills

still

lack

sufficient

access

to

up-to-date,

balanced,

readable

communications that would support effective decision making (Pond, et al. 1997
pp.753-760).

It is clear that risk communication has to start in the contingency planning stage with
the active contribution of decision makers to ensure that stakeholders concerns are
listened to and considered. Decision makers in this process have to bear in mind
that stake holders often are more concerned with issues to do with trust, credibility,
competence, fairness, caring and compassion than about oil spill statistics and the
details of quantitative risk assessment.

5.5.2

Crisis communication
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When risk suddenly becomes a reality crisis communication takes precedence. The
usual common mistake is that decision makers strictly stick to the risk
communication set plans and tend to neglect public relations and communications.
This leads to speculations from the media, more outrage from the stakeholders, and
consequently a tenser atmosphere in the command and control team handling the
crisis. On a large scale exercise carried out by France in the Mediterranean Sea
some crisis communication difficulties were encountered internally (between on
scene personnel and the central crisis handling room) and externally (in dealing with
the media). The feed back process recommended that:
•

To quickly release factual information;

•

To centralize information before dispatch;

•

To have more specific crisis management training for media officers and;

•

To optimize organization and cooperation between media officers and
operational personnel (Calonne & Rousseau, 1999).

However, the main problem experienced in this exercise was that decision makers
obviously could not handle easily the massive flow of information from various
sources while three types of operations were conducted simultaneously (equipment
deployment, incident management and media handling). These three actions taking
place in parallel appeared to have negative effects on the incident management
exercise as decision makers complained that they could not keep up with the speed
of events with an efficient response action (Kerstholt, 1997, pp. 185-192). The
feedback process also recommended modifying the management structure to come
closer to the Incident Command System (ICS) in the United States. (Refer to
appendix 5 for an overview of the ICS).

Towards the final construction of our scientific decision support tool the growing
demand and use of oil spill modeling by governments and industry cannot be
overruled. However, this is still a highly controversial issue as it incorporates the
chemical characteristics of oil, physical behavior, meteorological and hydrographic
data. The next section will try to highlight the capabilities and limitations of such
models as they highly contribute to the oil spill decision-making process worldwide.
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5.6 Modeling spill impacts: a closer look.

The growing need for quantification of impacts resulting from oil spills is not only for
the simple prediction of the movement of spilled oil but also for risk assessment,
contingency planning and environmental benefit analysis. Historically, attempts at
quantification were only available by trying to collect field data, which rarely existed.
What could be feasible and cost effective is to estimate impacts using the existing
knowledge of the physical and chemical properties of oils and their transport in the
environment. The new generation of spill models can simulate the entrainment of oil
into the water, subsurface transport, sedimentation or resurfacing as well as
quantifying the impact of oil on biological resources, such as fish, shellfish, birds,
and their food sources.

For the purpose of this research work the Author contacted SINTEF Applied
Chemistry in Norway, Applied Science Associates (ASA) and the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the USA. They supplied restricted
licensed copies of their latest models (OSCAR, SIMAP and ADIOS2). These models
were studied closely to verify the scope of user-friendly features in contrast to the
complexity of input and output data from the decision makers’ standpoint. The
questions asked during this study were as follows:

5.6.1

Trajectory models and Trajectory analysis: do we need one or both?

The three models use mathematical equations to predict the movement of spilled oil.
The models are not as simple as taking three percent of the wind speed as the
velocity of the center of the slick but much more complicated. It is clear that using
the model trajectory as a stand alone system once a spill has occurred to predict
where the slick will end up is an invalid simplification of the real world. The results,
though, will depend on the value and accuracy of the input data, its software design
and how the results are interpreted.
The process of making a trajectory analysis is of more use to decision makers as it
constitutes running the model hundreds of times (stochastic modeling) for a variety
of possible scenarios to try to get a more accurate idea about where the oil will end
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up and when. The stochastic model in SIMAP (French et al., 1999 pp.243-270)
could be used to build up statistical data about the range of distances and directions
oil spills are likely to travel from a particular site. This will be done with given
historical wind and current speed and direction data for the area. For each model
run the date is automatically randomized to provide a different probability distribution
for wind and current conditions during the spill. The results are arranged according
to their probability in a statistical form which provides a constructive support to
decision makers.

5.6.2 Can remote sensing and trajectory analysis interact during a spill
incident?

Remote sensing for oil spills can be done by over flights, collecting data from
surface drifting buoys or satellite tracking. Initial reports are very helpful in
calibrating the trajectory predictions, which can help to re-direct the expensive
aircraft for aerial surveillance, and identify false-positive observations. During a spill
running a trajectory model without real data collected from the field will soon
become irrelevant. Another question arises about the time span needed to enter this
updated data into the model (Hurford, 1988, pp. 7-17).

A valid example would be the choices the user has when entering vital current data
in the OSCAR model (Reed et al, 2002). Clicking on the setup menu will open a
dialogue as shown in Fig. 5.2. When the user selects New or Open a current grid
will appear. This grid is variable in dimensions and can be adapted to the needs of
the user. A grid size between 50x50 and 200x200 cells is normal; one may select a
default current profile (if available) or create an optimal grid for the release area. The
updated data from remote sensing can be drawn as vectors in each cell or in a few
numbers only depending on the variety of data and time available of the user. The
Spread function fills the grid based on the value in a few cells, which reduces the
accuracy of the predicted spill location.
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Fig.5.2 Example of a current grid display in OSCAR

source :(Reed et al 2002)

The entry of the tidal currents data and the wind data in this model (OSCAR) follow
a similar trend. It is clear that the more time utilized and the more reliable the remote
sensing data the more accurate will be the results. However one relevant question
may be if those two inputs (tidal currents and wind) will be available and could be
fed into the model during the stressful situation of handling a spill crisis. Decision
makers tend to apply the simplistic solutions of a constant wind and current in the
models resulting in large deviations in the predicted fates and positions of oils.

5.6.3

Is it possible to run a spill model using uncertain information about the
area and just “fill in” an estimate of the currents?

Many developing countries in the process of building up their oil spill contingency
plan structure would purchase packages of spill modeling software to be used by
decision making personnel in spill crisis. These packages may be complemented by
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GIS 16 maps of the area of concern to the customer as a bonus from the maker.
Users in the lack of minimum inputs would have no choice but to enter unreliable
and unscientific data that will create incorrect outputs from the model.
Feeding the spill models with the correct data from current measurements is almost
always the most difficult part in preparing a spill trajectory forecast. This difficulty
was experienced in all three trajectory models reviewed.

The ADIOS2 model addressed the issue of uncertainty in fed data. This model gives
the option to choose the uncertainty function for three input variables that are often
uncertain in a real spill event (volume of oil spilled, wind speed and emulsification
progress). Whenever the user selects one or more as uncertain, the model makes
multiple runs to determine the output results considering this uncertainty. The
function was further investigated by running the model several times without using
the uncertainty function with exactly the same input data. The results showed that
the area of the resulting slicks were different. The technical manual reasoned this to
randomized small-scale gyres in the model, which slightly differs each time the
model, is run.

5.6.4

Optimum use of spill modeling

In order to acquire optimum results from the current generation of spill models a
defined strategy to deal with such models must be first defined. Many researchers in
this area favor the “minimum regret” rather than the “maximum win” (Galt, 1998;
Lehr et al. 1995; Jones, 1999). A maximum-win strategy would be one where the
very best estimates of winds, currents, and initial quantity of oil spilled are fed into
the model with the resulting forecast taken as “the” threat that needs to be
responded to. A minimum-regret strategy on the other hand, would use all available
analytical techniques to investigate the sensitivity of various estimates of errors in
the input data and would explore the resulting implication by running different
scenarios. For example, would a frontal system transiting over the spill area
yesterday have a significant effect on the forecasted time of shore impact? Or does
this affect the usable current pattern in the area of concern? What are the
16

Geographic Information System
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consequences of this transit on the planning of response options? Galt (1995)
argues that this trend is significantly more difficult which could be a reason why most
decision makers refrain from following this strategy. Decision makers, to carry out
this type of analysis must, understand not only the full capabilities of the models, but
also what they cannot provide.

Once decision makers reach this stage, they can create a comprehensive briefing
material, which provides a “best guess” that covers alternate possibilities presenting
any type of threat to different sensitive resources. The major difference between
these two approaches is that the minimum-regret strategy can identify low
probability, but extremely serious or expensive; scenarios that may require the
development of alternate protection strategies while the maximum win strategy will
only identify the most eminent threat (Galt & Payton, 1996).

5.6.4.1 The Trajectory Analysis Planner (TAP)

In the context of a “Minimum Regret” strategy a new tool was developed by NOAA
to help decision makers assess their response effectiveness: the trajectory analysis
planner TAP (Barker & Healy, 2001). TAP is an interface to a database of thousands
of modeled oil spill trajectories that represent a compilation of all possible spills. This
is based on the “worst case” scenario from a given spill at a given time. To generate
these scenarios, sets of oceanographic and meteorological conditions are selected
for the area of concern and the model is run repeatedly while results are recorded.
The recorded results are transformed to statistical data that help decision makers
quantify the behavior of oil spills in their own region.

A companion application to TAP called the resource manager is the tool to create
and edit the resource files. This can be in a text-file format; the locations of the sites
of concern can be entered into a GIS system to create resource files. If any
environmental sensitivity index maps exist for this area they can be easily integrated
into the system along with the level of concern LOC 17 for each site. To display data
17

The level of concern LOC is the amount of oil that would be expected to significantly impact a
particular site.
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TAP provides five display modes each answering a different topic of interest to
decision makers. One mode named Shore Line Impact Analysis helps to answer the
usual questions when a spill is threatening a coast line, and which areas of the
shoreline which are likely to be impacted. A source of the hypothetical spill is
selected and the result will be displayed at the GIS map in color as shown in fig.5.3.

Fig 5.3 An example of shoreline impact analysis for a part of San Diego Bay

Colors indicate the percentage of modeled spills that exceeded the level of concern
at each reception site five days after the spill.

Source: (Barker & Healy, 2001)

The limitations of TAP are the very large amount of data that must be stored for
each location (about 5 G.B) and the long processing time of such extensive
database. This example illustrates the need of the continuity of processing of
historical and actual data which could be done by many countries on a smaller scale
to build up their own statistical data that could be used in upgrading their
contingency plans.
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5.7 Conclusion

Countries with well-established national oil spill contingency plans and seeking to
build up a scientific tool for decision support need to consider the following:
•

The process of building up the support tool is lengthy and needs the
utilization

of

several

types

of

expertise

(technical,

scientific

and

organizational).
•

States are responsible for their own ERA; this process is by no means static.
It requires frequent updates once a new stressor is introduced or a sensitive
resource is identified (e.g. constructing a new off shore oil loading facility or
building up a new beach resort area).

•

Decision making personnel at the policy level may actively contribute in the
update of the ERA. This will enable them to couple the results with oil spill
planning & contingency measures.

•

By integrating the NEBA with the existing ERA, further environmental
damage could be avoided by the right choice of the clean-up technique. This
is rather obvious in major spill cases.

•

The distinction between the planned risk communication layout and the
actual crisis communication is very important. Decision makers should try to
deal with the needs and inquiries from various stake holders at the time of
crisis handling.

•

Dispatching quick, factual and centralized information to the media is actually
reducing a main stress factor on the decision makers. If the media is left to
speculate, the consequences may be more agitation of the public, and more
demands reflected on the response organization.

•

The structure of the crisis management team contributes directly in reducing
the stress posed by the need to analyze the enormous amount of data
pouring in during the spill crisis.

•

The uncertainty factor in the in-put data for spill models cannot be eliminated
even in the most advanced models.

•

The integration of real-time remote sensing data with built-in physical and
chemical fates models could lead to a more accurate trajectory forecast.
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•

By supporting the “minimum regret” strategy decision makers would become
more familiar with spill models in-hand. This will allow them to run hundreds
of

potential

scenarios

during

the

planning

stage,

thus

building-up

comprehensive knowledge about capabilities and limitations of such models.
•

Towards a sound decision, it is important to remember that the very best fullscale representation of the spill process is the actual spill itself. If decision
makers cannot recognize this fact and endeavor to acquire remote sensing
data and take advantage of it. The results will be substandard no matter how
complex the logarithmic representations and colorful the model data
presentation turn out to be.

Reviewing the above it is clear that decision-making personnel handling oil spill
cases starting from the planning stage to the actual combating need extensive
training and knowledge building. This is identified as the missing link in the decision
support tools that most countries need to provide to their crisis managers. The next
chapter will discuss how these personnel could be trained efficiently to be able to
interpret the wide range of information introduced to them during a spill crisis and
use them to the benefit of the decision making process.
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Chapter Six
Training and Assessment of Decision Makers: The Missing Link
6.1 Introduction

Effective spill response requires trained and competent people, means for efficient
training and assessing the competence of staff involved in the operation. This
chapter will approach the area of training & assessment of decision makers using
simulation and virtual reality techniques as well as tackle the subject of the role of
Geographic Information Systems in facilitating such training and assessment tasks.

6.2 Simulator Training Approach

Given the nature of any oil spill crisis, the decision making process will often be
carried out under time-constraint and stressful conditions; the challenge is how best
to optimize the use of simulator training in preparing individuals and groups for the
unpredictable? 0rasanu, (1997) suggests how training may be enhanced to prepare
people for handling crisis under stress:
•

Decision-making is a skill. Like all skills it may be learned through practice.
By reducing the cognitive load through simulation practice, we can create
experts who are less stressed than novices in stressful and threatening
situations.

•

The direct development of situational awareness that is done in most
simulation scenarios might counteract the consequences of stress.

•

Stress effects of decision-making may be reduced by sharing the process
with the members of a team, which is usually the case in simulation training.

From these points we can deduce that the primary justification for simulation training
in spill crisis is based on the belief that by exposing key individuals or spill
management teams to a variety of spill scenarios, they will enrich their mental stores
of situations, thus enhancing their repertories of decision making. Another
justification is that by exposing people to such situations provides them with the selfconfidence that they can handle future unknown situations.
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6.2.1

Stress levels under simulated conditions

A research project was carried out during a critical incident management simulation
to determine the degree of stress experienced by those involved in the exercise
(Sharpley, 1994). Findings showed that participants spent much of the simulation in
a low stress state and only spent brief intense periods under high psychological
stress, indicated by high heart rates. To gain comparative data, the heart rates of
the same participants were monitored in the real working environment. Similar
patterns of stress were discovered, with sustained periods of relatively low heart
activity, suggestive of low stress, punctuated by short periods of far more intense
heart rate activity mirroring phases of intense decisional activity. These findings
provided useful indicators of the range of psychological stresses participants could
be subjected to in a simulated environment, which led to a re-appraisal of the
appropriate design of the scenarios used in the training process. This in turn
resulted in a high degree of operational fidelity 18 where the experience gained in the
simulator was highly transferable to the working environment (Crego & Spinks,
1997) and (Hays & Singer, 1989).

6.3 Virtual reality training environments (VRTEs)

A Virtual Reality Training Environment (VRTE) is commonly considered to be a
computer generated representation of a real world environment with which trainees
can interact in order to achieve their training objectives. This technology has much
in common with simulation technology, for at its simplest level it is a simulation with
some aspect of reality. The existing oil spill crisis simulators provide some level of
virtual reality according to their type (Harmon& Kenney, 1994). There are two main
types of VRTEs:
a) Immersive VRTEs typically involve the user wearing a head mounted display,
haptic and force feedback gloves…etc.
b) Cave in (non-immersive) VRTEs in which the trainee is either totally or partially
surrounded by projection screens onto which the representation of the training
18

Fidelity refers to how well the training environment represents reality
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environment is displayed. The trainee usually interacts with the environment by
means of joysticks, touch screen, or a high fidelity control console (Miller et al. 1996,
pp. 39-48).

The second non-immersive type of VRTEs is the one commonly used for training of
oil spill management personnel.

6.4 Considerations for using Simulation and VRTEs in Oil Spill Response
Training

i)

Safety

In cases where novice trainees are at risk in real life cases (Realia) 19, a
simulation or VRTE eliminates the hazard. This is applicable to oil spill cases as
the inappropriate use of spill countermeasures could aggravate the situation as
discussed in earlier chapters.
ii)

Cost

Simulations and VRTEs are considered when the cost of training with Realia is
unaffordable. The mobilizing of all relevant resources engaged in combating a
major oil spill is very expensive. In addition some of the resources used might
need to be removed from productive service elsewhere in the society for the
purpose of conducting a real exercise. The simulation facility establishment and
its running costs would be significantly less expensive. The emerging trend of
multiple applications of simulator facilities not only for training purposes for oil
spill response but also for training on other types of crisis and for research and
actual organizational use in oil spill cases have proved to be cost effective
(Caird, 1996).
iii)

Efficiency

Simulation and VRTEs are used when intentionally spilling large amounts of oil
for training purposes is not considered an option for practical or environmental
concerns. Both have the ability also to compress the time needed for training
compared to Realia.
19

Realia is a common term used in simulation terminology referring to real life training or “on the job
training”
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iv)

Flexibility

In simulators and VRTEs trainees can get frequent practice dealing with
problems that may seldom occur, if at all, in the real world, but are too critical to
ignore. Different programming could change various parameters such as wind
and current conditions, quantities of spilled oil, available technical resources etc.
v)

Transfer

Training in simulators and VRTEs promote a high degree of transfer to real
world situations more rapidly than traditional training methods (e.g. lecture or
tutorial). Both also provide a certain degree of fidelity thus allowing a deeper,
richer understanding of the task. This confirms well with training the managing
staff handling a major spill as the system can easily transfer them almost
completely to what is similar to a command centre handling the crisis.

Table 6.1 summarizes the considerations for the use of simulation and VRTEs

Cost
Safety

Realia

Simulation

Very high

High

Low

VRTEs
Relatively high

High

Very high

Efficiency

Very low

High

Highest

Flexibility

Very low

Higher

Highest

Transfer

Highest

Relatively high

High

Source; modified from Harmon & Kenney, 1994.

6.5 Complexity of Simulated and VRTEs

Although simulated exercises for oil spill response training offer a number of
benefits, it is important to point out the danger of overloading the simulated
environment with too many parameters (Treu, 1996, pp. 162-169). The main
problem in this approach to the spill management training is the degree of
complexity the trainee may have to face during the exercise. It has been believed for
a long time that the more a simulated environment approximates the real one, the
more likely that the training in the former will transfer to the latter. Lately it has
become clear that it is much more important to understand which aspects of an
overall task need to be supported in the simulated environment, rather than the
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overall fidelity of the simulation system. There is some evidence from many
simulation systems that higher levels of fidelity and complexity have little or no effect
on skill transfer and reductions in fidelity actually improve training (Caird, 1996). To
overcome this problem the simulation scenario representing the spill crisis should be
structured to reduce the environment-task complexity until the trainees become
familiarized with the system. Once some task proficiency occurs, complexity can
incrementally be added into the training scenario.

6.6 Global use of Oil Spill Management Simulators (OSMSs)

Examining the current availability of OSMSs in training institutions worldwide, it is
clear that they are still very scarce compared to the other types of simulators, as
shown in table 6.2. It is noticed that the delivery of other types of simulators is an
increasing trend recently, which indicates a high level of acceptance of the benefits
of such systems especially in maritime communities (Muirhead, 1996).

Table.6.2 Estimates of marine simulator types at 1/6/96
Simulators with a visual ship handling facility

106

Radar and radar navigation

380

Engine room

110

Navigation instruments

60

Cargo and ballast control

45

Fisheries

30

GMDSS

60

Oil spill management trainer

4

VTS

10

High speed craft

2

River boat

3

Estimated total

810

Source: Muirhead, 1996
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Table 6.2 Estimates of global marine simulator types at 1/10/02
Simulators with a visual ship handling facility

158

Radar and radar navigation

360

Engine room

100

Navigation instruments

60

Cargo and ballast control

50

Fisheries

35

GMDSS

320

Oil spill management trainer

5

VTS

10

High speed craft

5

River boat

3

Estimated total

1106

Source: Muirhead, 2003

It should be noted that the number of OSMSs has not increased in the last seven
years (only one more system was installed see table.6.2), although some other
simulators had a sharp rise such as GMDSS. The reason could be the difficulty in
substituting a full OSMS with the widely spread part-task simulation tools, which are
much cheaper and less sophisticated. This compromise especially in the area of oil
spill management, may not present the needed training atmosphere for decision
makers. However, many countries are still using the classic table top exercise aided
with a standalone computer with an oil trajectory model.

6.7 The OPRC convention: Is a global standard for OSMSs in the pipeline?

The STCW 95 Convention stipulates minimum standards for the training using
marine simulators, which already came into force on the 1st.February.2002. In the
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same year the OPRC20 convention came into force on the 13th May 1995, defining a
training program of three levels (IMO, 1995). The need for upgrading those three
courses and developing a model course started with the establishment of the OPRC
working group (OPRC WG) in 1992. Years of work and co-operation between IMO
member states, non-governmental organizations and the industry produced three
detailed and comprehensive model courses. Although the use of OSMSs was not
mentioned in the course delivery methods, the issue of the development and
standardization of the instructional materials was on the agenda (Slater, et al.1997).
The hope is that this issue again is included in the agenda of future MEPC
committee meetings as this would definitely be required considering the slow
introduction of simulators in oil spill response training.

6.8 Competence Assessment of decision makers

There is currently no standard qualification for oil spill decision makers, technicians
and first line responders. Should one be devised in the future the competencies
required could only be derived from the feedback of training programs (Gair & Salt
2003). A fundamental problem in competence assessment for oil spill crisis decision
makers is that real spill cases cannot be used and therefore simulations must be
employed. For this purpose the assessment scenarios need to be carefully written
and managed and should be as realistic as possible (Barnett, 1997, pp. 77-84). The
assessment itself will often create a useful level of anxiety, which will produce
relevant psychological and physiological symptoms. Assessors should be able to
introduce an element of stress into scenarios and to judge the overall performance
of the vital decision making process (Flin & Slaven, 1995). By having this ability to
measure competence levels with the help of OSMSs, response organizations can
develop plans and define training needs for their own staff.

20

The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC)
1990.
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6.9 The proposed model structure of OSMSs

This proposed structure was extracted and modified from the specifications of the oil
spill crisis management simulator in the “Arab Academy for Science, Technology
and Maritime Transport” (AASTMT) and the “Polaris” crisis management simulator.
The former has been in use for more than five years to train the oil spill managers
and on-scene commanders in Egypt, while the latter is actually used by Norway as a
command center in actual oil spills.

Any proposed OSMS needs to fulfill the following points in order to achieve its goal
in the most efficient and economic way:
•

Function in accordance with the organizational structure and this country’s
national oil spill contingency plan (NOSCP).

•

Function as an exercise training and simulation system.

•

Function as a tool to assist in risk management, spill mitigation and planning
measures.

•
•

Function for specific oil spill events or as generic over all-hazards system.
Function in an exercise mode without information crossing between real
world and exercise.

•
6.9.1

Have the capability to upgrade/expand into handling real spill cases.

Proposed components of the OSMS system

For optimum training and assessment results the OSMS may contain the following
units, noting that the layout may be modified according to the spill organizational
structure of each country:a) Response room which incorporates a meeting table for at least 8 persons
dedicated for the management team, PC work station, white board,
VCD/VCR player, 4 assigned telephone lines and a CCTV camera system.
b) Emergency support room or command centre, which should incorporate at
least 8 PC workstations, each with a separate telephone line, a facsimile
machine, VHF radios and a projector screen.
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c) Instructor control station, which should incorporate all equipment, required
for the successful conduct, monitoring and control of the exercise or training.
d) At least three on-scene commander units, which could be, used either as
floating units, helicopters or both (See fig. 6.1).
External
Players

Planning section
Instructors

Response
Room
On-Scene Units

Operations Section

Fig. 6.1 possible lay out of an OSMS.

e) The system should have the ability to interface not less than 4 external
players to the spill exercise.

6.9.2

System Architecture

The main aim of the OSMS is to train personnel involved in oil spill crisis
management and response decision-making and enhance team skill building. It
could also be used to develop and maintain a real management centre for actual
spill response events. The simulation component must be able to simulate the spill
itself and the countermeasure operations. This is usually done with the aid of built-in
trajectory and physical fates models as described in the previous chapter.
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6.9.2.1 Data Base Management System (DBMS)

The end-user interface to the system is required to be user friendly as the trainees
could vary in their computer knowledge. This could be done under the widely known
windows environment. (Windows NT). The different databases serving the system
could be related by commercially available relational data base management
systems (RDBMS), such as Oracle or Sybase.

The user access to the system should preferably be password protected. The failure
of any individual windows workstation shall not in any way degrade or alter the
performance or capabilities of the remainder of the system.

The data collected by the system during the exercise should be available in a central
repository accessed by the instructors. This central repository is to be managed by
the RDBMS, which contains all the information critical to the effective management
of oil spill crisis response.
The RDBMS should time stamp and preserve all of the following data:
•

Equipment procurement, activation and deactivation.

•

User log in and logout actions.

•

All procedure/checklist actions

•

Personal notifications.

•

Briefings / meetings (internal and public).

•

Duty rosters and schedules.

6.9.2.2 Geographic information system (GIS)

The GIS is a system of computer software, hardware and data aiding personnel to
control, analyze and present information that is tied up to a spatial location. The
incorporation of GIS with the OSMS provides a vital contribution to the decision
support tool discussed earlier (see fig.6.2)
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Fig. 6.2 Flow chart presenting various data inputs to the modeling system.
Source: “POLARIS” product description sheets.

The industry standard software usually includes a large layered map display, which
should be available at each workstation. The specific GIS layers are usually
determined by the functional position of the user. For example the user can display
the layer indicating the area of the spill impact(s) along with the layer of sensitive
resources in the same area (human, biological etc) see fig. 6.3.

Fig.7.3 Thematic layers in GIS display

Layers

.

Source: WWW.GIS.COM
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The main data of the concerned geographic area must be available on base maps
that include vector based definitions of the coastal regions, scanned nautical charts,
and digitized aerial and satellite photos. The base maps serve as the foundation, of
the GIS displays, additional GIS data layers providing the trainees with an overview
of the locations of environmental, economic and geographic attributes, as well as
the locations of critical resources within and near the emergency or exercise area
(Kerdany & Abou-elkawam, 2002, pp. 61-68). Where available such information
shall include but is not limited to:
•

General (marinas, beaches, hotels, ports…)

•

Biology (fish, birds, mammals…)

•

Physical (marsh grass, palm…)

•

Channels / anchorages

•

Navigation aids

•

Satellite photos

•

Shoreline features

•

Populated places

•

Roads & rail roads

•

Airports

6.9.2.3 Logistics and resources

The proposed system should be able to track response assets (personnel,
equipment and vehicles) during an oil spill or an exercise. It should be possible to
completely control these assets by the simulation host; from their starting points,
through staging areas, arrival at the spill site, and the start of the countermeasure
operations. This control could be either in the hands of instructors or trainees during
the exercise.

6.9.2.4 Financial tracking

The proposed system could be able to generate purchase orders and financial
reports to be able to track expenditures over time. The system could display
graphical descriptions of cost expenditures and report the total cost of the oil spill
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response to-date. Once an asset enters active simulation, information about the
asset is available to controllers and trainees.

6.9.2.5 Communication

The system should have an adequate number of dedicated phone lines and at least
one facsimile machine for external communication. The combating vessels and
helicopter should be equipped with VHF 21 and UHF22radios to keep in continuous
contact with the control room. It could prove to be practical to install satellite
communication facilities (Inmarsat B, C & M) to have total independence from local
failures in power or phone lines.

6.9.2.6 Message management / incident reports and logs

The system may incorporate some or all of the following features according to its
intended use (training only or managing actual spills):
•

Send messages through an approval point before transmission either inside
or outside.

•

Send and receive hard copy message traffic between members within the
control center and outside to the on-scene responders and external players;

•

Assign and track missions / tasks;

•

Preserve message traffic for historical records;

•

Sort / view and print messages;

•

Sent pre-built messages at pre-determined times during exercises / training;

•

Indicate the priority and type of message;

•

Assign a unique number for each outgoing and incoming message.

The system should also be able to record “Actions” taken during the spill response
or the exercise. These “Actions” may be logged automatically or manually, and
become part of the permanent records of the exercise or training.

21
22

VHF stands for very high frequency radios.
UHF stands for ultra high frequency hand held radios.
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6.9.2.7 Reference material / personnel records

The system could be able to store various reference materials in the database such
as chemical characteristics of various types of oils & products, trade names and
synonyms. It could also provide specific information on health and safety hazards
which response teams could be liable to while combating the pollution caused by
these different types of oils and chemicals.

The reference section may also contain individual records on personnel assigned to
various spill response duties including their specific skills and the previous training
courses they have attended. The above information can be used in other parts of
the database such as notification listings.

6.9.2.8 Environmental damage assessments

The system may be able to store and use the ERA forms and show the damaged
areas on GIS maps. This could be done if the sensitivity data is captured and used
to predict the quantitative levels of damage that might be caused to specific
resources as a result of an oil spill. This information could be incorporated along
with the spill trajectory model as explained before or as a stand-alone system.

6.9.2.9 Economic damages / compensation claims

The system may contain an economic damages assessment model which is able to
provide an estimate of the effects caused by the spill incident on the natural or
human resources. These types of models need identified “Targets” to work on. The
data base containing the sensitive resources could be used in these models as the
identified “Targets” such as commercial ports, beach resorts, marinas, fishing farms,
public beaches and marine parks.
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6.9.2.10

Instructor / exercise control functions

The proposed system should enable the instructors to design and develop an
unlimited number of spill scenarios to confirm to training and competence
assessment needs. Individual scenarios may be stored in a library to be used at
various training levels. The instructor should be the initiator of the exercise from his
workstation. He must be able to freeze, resume, play in-fast and reset the exercise
to an earlier time. The instructors and external players should be able to use
communication equipment to role-play external agencies in an exercise.

6.10

Conclusion

The skill of efficient decision making in stressful situations is vital. In an oil spill crisis
DMs are subjected to variable stress levels. The on-job training of such personnel is
always faced with difficulties ranging from logistical to safety. The importance of
building up skills can never be ignored and the introduction of simulated and VRTEs
deserves more focus and consideration from all nations.

While many other types of simulation systems are progressing considerably,
especially in the maritime training field, only one OSMS has been established in the
last seven years. Countries (developing and developed) need to re-consider the
benefits of establishing such training facilities. Many countries are sceptical about
the cost effectiveness of such establishments, which can prove more justifiable if the
same facility could also be used in actual oil spills as a spill management center.

Having a closer look at what the proposed OSMS can offer, we can find some
solutions for certain pending problems in the oil spill management area, one of
which is the competence assessment of assigned & potential decision makers. This
is solved by the sound structure of various spill scenarios, introducing elements of
stress to provide a closer level to the reality needed. Assessment can then take
place for those personnel under such conditions and feedback data can be collected
to help upgrade and re-structure the scenarios to achieve optimum training levels.
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Another problem is the known complexity and the huge amount of data that DMs
have to deal with while handling the oil spill crisis. This is also solved by the
incorporation of GIS with the various databases serving the system. The DMs
through GIS, displayed on every workstation are able to view, analyze and scroll
through huge amounts of data, which are presented in various visualized forms (e.g.
maps, graphs, curves, bar and pie charts, satellite and remote sensing images etc.).
DMs can also link any of the available databases (e.g. resources, logistics, finance,
sensitivity, communication, risk assessment etc.) to the graphs or maps and obtain
vitally needed data in limited time.

To sum-up, the whole construction of the personnel decision-making support tool
must have a strong scientific foundation. This can only be achieved by having
access to accurate input data and information and the efficient training of personnel
handling the oil spill crisis. They can reach high competence standards only if they
keep on developing their decision-making skills through continuous exercising under
simulated conditions.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion, Recommendations and Further Research
7.1 Introduction:

The combating of oil spills is a complex undertaking that involves various actors at
the international, regional, national and local levels. This study identified various
cumulative gaps leading either to delays in the decision making process or to a
decision leading to more destruction than a spill has already caused. Every time a
major spill occurs biased decisions also occur, with destruction to the biological and
human resources also occurring. On this matter Linden (1990, p.119) states that:

The underlying problem is that, for too many years, environmental issues
such as the threat of oil spills have been neglected. As a result, already won
experience has been lost. When a new spill occurs, old mistakes are
repeated.

7.2 Primary Findings

While decision makers exhibit some expertise in implementing the procedures of the
previously set contingency plans, there is significant variability in individual decision
makers’

interpretations

and

understandings.

This

variability

results

in

inconsistencies and disagreements among decision makers. Specific knowledge
gaps, information needs, or misperceptions were discovered in the areas discussed
below: •

The study indicates that existing scientific information on the fates and
effects of various types of oil in the marine environment has not been
successfully communicated to decision makers. This was clearly displayed in
the cases studied and the questionnaire results (see appendix one and two).
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•

Misconceptions in the area of mechanical combating are still common
especially in the deployment methods of booms and skimmers, how to tend
them and their technical limitations when used in the field.

•

Some reluctance was noticed among decision makers to use new applied
technologies such as the addition of emulsion breakers, considering the use
of in-situ burning or bioremediation.

•

Most decision makers are of the opinion that the use of simulators in general
would be very beneficial to the training process. However, there is limited
knowledge among them whether the use of oil spill management simulators
(OSMSs) would be effective in enhancing the competence of spill managers.
This could be due to the lack of experience because of the scarcity of such
simulators worldwide.

7.3 Conclusions from studied areas in this Research

When these gaps and misperceptions were identified this study tried to focus on
some of the most important areas where decision makers usually ask the question
“how to?” which indicates either a lack of experience or knowledge or both. The
following summarizes the findings deduced from the topics approached in this study:
-

Decision-makers (DMs), when considering the fate of oil, have to
differentiate between weathering processes and their effect on the physical
and chemical characteristics of oils, and the movement of oil due to
hydrographic and meteorological conditions. They should not focus on one
neglecting the other.

-

Safety precautions against volatile gases must be considered when working
with oils having a higher evaporation rate.

-

The emulsification process could incorporate up to 80% water in the
“mousse” formed. DMs have to consider this before deciding which type of
skimmers to use or if the ISB is an option.

-

Low concentrations of aromatic hydrocarbons are usually dissolved in water.
Soluble aromatic compounds are particularly toxic to fish and aquatic life
only if occurring in shallow, protected waters with limited dilution capacity.
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-

The biodegradation and weathering processes are slower in oils with high
aromatic and asphaltine content. This is to be carefully considered if the
option of “leave alone” is chosen as those types could persist in the
environment more than expected.

-

The application method of chemical dispersants should be related directly to
the distance of the spill site from the heliport or the airport if the arial
application is chosen. The multi-pass approach over the spill is preferred for
better results. This should be monitored by other high altitude craft to guide
and verify the effectiveness of the operation.

-

The use of dispersant vessels may prove to be more effective if the spill site
is close to land and boat terminals. The remote sensing or aircraft monitoring
should also be used to verify the effectiveness of the operation.

-

The available scientific data resulting from the extensive research on the
issue of chemical dispersants lately provides an aid to DMs as to where and
when they can be used.

-

Seafood tainting is minimal with light oil products while the risk is higher for
pelagic fish with medium crude oils. Benthic organisms are more affected by
heavy crude oils and fuel oils that easily sink to the bottom.

-

Salt marches are sometimes considered wasteland of low or no value.
However, they are often highly productive and have a key role in the food
web chain. They are also very sensitive to most clean-up techniques. Once
polluted, the clean-up process should proceed with caution.

-

Corals are most sensitive to oil especially in the short term; they suffer
decrease in growth rates & colonization capacity. However they tend to
recover in the long term.

-

Mangrove trees have the ability to tolerate dispersed oil better than untreated
oil. If the mangrove area impact in unavoidable DMs could consider the use
of dispersants to minimize damage.

-

Translation of ecological losses into money in the aftermath of a major spill is
not easy, but DMs handling a spill should be aware of this causal relationship
when considering different countermeasures.

-

The failures in Boom performance when used in containing, diverting or
cascading patterns are not only due to winds and currents, but also are
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related to the reserve buoyancy of this particular boom. The more buoyancy
to weight ratio usually reflects better performance in all stationary and towed
configurations.
-

The performance of oil skimmers could be greatly enhanced when attention
is given to the difficulties in pumping high viscous oils and emulsions. After
recovery from the water, the additional viscous oil pumping systems (VOPS)
may be the solution for many problems in this area.

-

In-situ burning (ISB) can achieve high removal rates if the ignitable oil could
be captured and isolated with fire booms to maintain the needed thickness
for each specific oil type. The window of opportunity is extended by the
addition of emulsion breakers. This may enhance the ignition process even
in previously non-ignitable emulsions.

-

Sorbent materials containing nonindegenous microbes, chemical solidifiers
and synthetics should be used with caution in sensitive environments. The
loose form of the chemical components they contain may pose an ecological
threat.

-

Although most countries have well-established national oil spill contingency
plans, the need for building up a scientific supporting tool for DMs to execute
those plans is an imminent task. The building up of this tool requires the
integration of data and information from multiple sources.

-

The active contribution of DMs in the ERA process will directly link the
results of such analysis with the dynamic upgrading of the national
contingency

plans.

This

approach

will

achieve

optimum

results

if

complemented with NEBA as DMs will be able to balance the advantages
and disadvantages of various combating or clean-up options.
-

Risk communication procedures defined in the contingency plan need not to
be followed strictly if a spill crisis occurs. Some flexibility in dealing with
outside communications (stake holders and media) may ease-up the tense
atmosphere on the DMs if the public are left to speculate on their own. The
sound crisis communication process could optimize the cooperation between
media officers and operational personnel.

-

Oil spill models are often used only for tracking the location and distribution
of oil. The new generation models address a wide range of environmental
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impacts along with the usual trajectory. DMs need to familiarize themselves
with the capabilities and limitations of the model in hand. This is done by
running the model in stochastic mode and building-up their own statistical
data. This data may prove to be viable in the decision-making process.
-

Once staff knowledge is built-up about all the inputs relating to the spill
management (physical, chemical, ecological, modeling, technical etc)
attention should be diverted to the skill and competence of decision makers.

-

The skill of decision making under the stress of an oil spill crisis needs
competent personnel to handle it. Competence cannot be achieved without
efficient and comprehensive training. Here the introduction of oil spill
management simulators (OSMSs) is justified.

-

OSMSs provide a safe, flexible virtual environment for training purposes.
They promote a high degree of transfer to the real world situations. The
investment in the establishment of OSMSs could be justified as they can be
used as actual command and control centers in a real oil spill crisis.

-

The OSMSs could improve the competence assessment problem of DMs
handling oil spills. To examine competence the running of various potential
scenarios and introducing stress elements during the exercise presents a
useful feed back of data and identified personnel capabilities.

7.4 Recommendations

This study has introduced the build-up of a scientifically based support tool to oil spill
DMs. The building-up of such a tool is a chain, which cannot afford a missing link.
Many countries lack the dedicated staff that only deals with oil spills. Most of the
time spill mangers are assigned other routine jobs and called in whenever the spill
occurs. In most countries dedicated spill managers and responders do exist but with
no professional cadre, meaning that they are not encouraged to dedicate their whole
career to this job. Even some private spill contractors find it difficult to stay in
business given the rarity of major spills.

To remedy this situation, it is recommended that countries with their different spill
management structures (Authoritarian, Democratic, Central, Local) develop a
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designated professional cadre for all levels of spill handling staff. This could be done
within governmental structures or even in the private sector. These personnel would
base their whole career on dealing with spills around the country. Such a group
could also be the core of the leading staff responding to all major spills as well as to
provide advice and assistance for smaller spills. Rather than losing experience
through rotation and reassignment a group of oil spill professionals would retain and
build experience.

The wide range of knowledge, skills and experience might be enhanced further by
sending this professional staff to advise or participate in responses to major spills
elsewhere in the region. The OPRC convention strongly encourages this notion and
many regional agreements are already in place (e.g. HELCOM, PERSIGA, and
REMPEC). Countries, which took a similar approach, proved to exercise more
sound decisions in cases of oil spills. (Personal contact. MCA May.2003), (Steen et
al. 2003 & OSRL, 2003).

Although the triple leveled IMO model courses for oil spill staff has been delivered in
many countries in recent years, it could so far ensure only a relatively low level of
knowledge among the staff responsible for handling spill cases. It is highly
recommended that the difference between knowledge and competence of oil spill
professionals must be identified and handled. Taking the example of the STCW95
Convention for seafarers who clearly identifies that knowledge only is not enough
but competence also must be practiced and assessed (IMO, 1995). The main
problem area in exercising competence would be “on the job training” for spill staff.
This could prove very difficult to achieve on regular basis due to various reasons
(safety, logistics, preparedness, costs, permissions etc).

The OSMSs could be introduced as a mandatory tool for the training and
assessment of such staff in the near future. Delegates of IMO member states may
present this vital topic on the agenda of the future work of MEPC without waiting for
the next major spill crisis. This action if decided could be a good example of the
proactive approach IMO has been trying to take in recent years.
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The establishment of such training facilities (OSMSs) requires large scale funding;
this is a clear obstacle for developing countries. The large investment could be
justified if the same facility can be used also for real oil spill combating as a
command and control centre. This would only require that the internal
communication systems used during the exercises are to be switched to the outside
world. National spill response organizations in developing countries need to seek
the support of national and international donor agencies highlighting the economic
and environmental benefits of the implementation of such training and response
methodology. IMO is also including the implementation of the model courses in
project proposals being developed for support from multilateral funding sources.
(Personal communication. TEC Committee- IMO head quarters. London. May 2003).

It is recommended that each country should generate a process whereby spill
responders on various levels can communicate their experiences to the policy
makers and contingency planners. The lessons learned from each minor spill could
be of vital importance in a major one. For example, if contingency planners reviewed
the characteristics and behaviors of heavy oils, this might lead them to strive to be
ready for at sea-recovery but not to completely rely on it. Because the best and most
meaningful chance to recover heavy oils from the sea is during favorable weather
and calm seas, there is no need to invest in large stockpiles of overly sophisticated
and specialized recovery equipment. Planning, simulated training, and using a mix
of standard oil spill response equipment and locally available resources would seem
to be the best approach.

In terms of equipment, decision-makers would be best advised to purchase booms,
skimmers, pumps, and storage tanks and support equipment that can be used for
the widest possible range of oils and conditions. In particular they should focus on
those skimming systems that cope well with heavy oils and weathered emulsions.
However, because both equipment budgets and storage space on vessels will
always be limited, it is recommended to avoid dependency on overly-specialized
devices as they need more training and are very sensitive to mishandling.
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Given the uniqueness of each spill incident it is recommended that good contact
should be maintained with key resource persons (e.g. biologists) with past spill
experience who may no longer be actively in spill response. These people could
serve as valuable advisors in the event of a spill. They should be integrated into the
action command groups so they can provide advice to personnel in the field. They
could also be consulted in the general contingency planning activities that occur
outside actual spill response activities.

It is recommended that good contact with the media, environmental organizations,
and local residents should be maintained during a spill response operation. These
parties should be kept informed of clean-up activities and provided with information
that can justify and defend the actions taken. A mechanism for the exchange of
information between responders and the public is to be generated, and in particular
allow for local residents to voice their concerns.

It is recommended that the previously mentioned GIS technology be best utilized to
meet the demands of each country in protecting the biological and socio-economic
resources of the marine and coastal environments. This could be done by the
generation of a proposed GIS team in every spill response organization. The team
may consist of a toxicologist, natural resource economist, biologist, a legal counsel,
and a GIS expert delegated to collect, analyze and store such data in appropriate
databases. The building-up of these databases in each country, as explained
before, would be a valuable tool for the decision making process.

7.5 Future Research

Towards a better performance of spill response teams and more sound decisions in
cases of oil spills the following could be considered:
•

Laboratory tests and experiments concerning the effects of chemical
dispersants, or boom and skimmer performance are vitally needed but still
have some limitations. Only moderate dynamic conditions may be
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investigated in test tanks to simulate the real conditions. It was observed that
test results are frequently de-rated according to assumptions of the
environmental parameters, such as wave heights, current, temperature etc.
there is limited knowledge to base such assumptions on. Future efforts
should focus on identifying rules for scaling of laboratory tests to open water
conditions.
•

Many tests have been run using oils of widely varying viscosities, but none
have related boom performance directly to oil viscosity with all other
conditions remaining the same. Future tests could be performed with a boom
of fixed dimensions and varying oil viscosities. These tests could be
repeated with changing boom characteristics, specifically buoyancy to weight
ratio and draft. These tests might be able to show if there is an optimum or
minimum boom draft required for specific viscosity oils at various tow
speeds.

•

Future research areas should be identified that can provide decision makers
with the information and facts they require to plan their response strategy
and to justify their decisions to the media, the general public, local residents,
and environmental organizations. As a start this could be done by revisiting
old spill sites to evaluate the effectiveness of the clean-up methods used and
to monitor the long-term fate and recovery of the oiled shorelines. This
information could also be used to update the national oil spill contingency
plans.

•

Further research should focus on the evaluation of the performance of the
new demulsifying dispersants. These new types of dispersants significantly
increase the time window of opportunity of using chemical dispersants, which
is usually a major concern for all spill response organizations. This could be
done either by laboratory or field studies to assess the dosage and time
relationships for both the demulsification and dispersion processes. For
example, better dispersants would require lower dosage and/or less time to
break emulsions and disperse oil.

•

Oil spill response planners, insurers, and other stakeholders should direct
their future research on developing an oil spill clean-up cost estimation
methodology. This proposed methodology should be country-specific and
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more precise than universal per-unit cost values that have been embedded
in the commercially available environmental models. The proposed cost
estimation model could be derived from studies of historical oil spill cost
data. Such historical data, if integrated with current mechanical recovery and
dispersant operation cost models, will provide an even better tool for
estimating and predicting oil spill clean-up costs.
•

Models to predict time windows of opportunity for the In-situ burning of oil
spills are not currently available. Future research should be directed to
testing of the ignition devices capability of raising oil surface temperatures to
flash point temperatures and linking the results to the potential ignitability of
floating oils. These results will help in developing such prediction models and
help in predicting the feasibility of in-situ burning.

Finally many countries need to revise their environmental laws, especially those
sections relating to marine pollution by oil. This could prove to be a contributing
factor towards solving many organizational and technical problems in dealing with
major oil spills. In conclusion, the words of Prof. P.K. Mukhrjee (2002) are
particularly relevant and worth remembering:

The subject of marine pollution is of prime importance in today’s maritime
world. In comparison with other areas of maritime law, many of which are
deep rooted in history, marine pollution concerns arose only after oil was
discovered in the early part of this century, and oil tankers entered the arena
of shipping and ocean transportation. The problems relating to pollution of
the seas are on going, as evidenced by frequent disasters of mammoth
proportions; and the law appears to be continuously developing to cope with
the consequences.
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Appendix One
Case Studies
Introduction:

In this appendix many in-famous oil spills are analyzed trying to detect where
decision makers could have made a more sound decision. The cases are spread
throughout two decades; nevertheless the similarity in the misperceptions and
confusion exercised by decision makers can be easily detected.

Case one: ARAGON

Spill Date 12/29/89
Maderian Archipelago, Portugal
Location 33 34N Latitude Longitude 015 34 W
Oil Product: Mexican Maya crude oil
Tank Vessel
Oil quantity: 17500 Barrels

Incident Summary:

While under tow, the Spanish tank vessel Aragon suffered damage during a storm
on December 29, 1989, approximately 360 miles off the coast of Morocco. The
damage resulted in the release of approximately 175,000 barrels of Mexican Maya
Crude Oil into the Atlantic Ocean, near the Maderian Archipelago. The Portuguese
Navy was in charge of the response. They monitored the initial movement of the oil
until it made landfall. Approximately three weeks after the spill, pollution occurred on
the Portuguese Island of Porto Santo, with oil believed to have been from the
Aragon. This was later confirmed when oil samples were taken from the vessel.
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Observations:

Decision makers handling this spill incident could not decide on any chemical or
mechanical countermeasure at sea possibly because of rough weather. The
surprising observation is that although the Portuguese navy closely monitored the
spill, no decision was taken to protect sensitive shorelines. The time was quite
enough (three weeks) to try taking action.

Case two: NESTUCCA

Spill Date 12/23/88
Grays Harbor, Washington
Location: 46 55 N Latitude Longitude 124 15 W
Oil Product Bunker C
Tank Barge
Oil quantity: 5500 Barrels

Incident Summary:

In the early morning of December 23, 1988, the tug Ocean Service collided with its
tow, the barge Nestucca, while trying to replace a broken tow line. Both the barge
and tug were owned by Sause Brothers Ocean Towing Co. of Coos Bay, Oregon
and were en route from Ferndale, Washington to Portland, Oregon when the
collision occurred approximately 3 kilometers off the coast of Washington, near
Grays Harbor. The barge was carrying over 69,000 barrels of Number 6 fuel oil. The
tug punctured a cargo tank, releasing an estimated 5500 barrels of the heavy
marine fuel into the ocean. It was an overcast, moonlit night and the vessels were
reportedly rolling in 6 to 10 foot swells.
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Observations:

The spill occurred in an area well known for its strong northerly currents. Decision
makers in this incident are reported to have a totally wrong estimate of both the
quantity of the spilled oil and the possible movement of oil. They observed some
sheen only on the water surface at the first two days and had the wrong impression
that the slick dispersed naturally. However it was later determined that a substantial
slick was moving beneath the surface.

The first shore impact of oil was on December 31 at the sensitive west coast of
Vancouver Island (8 days after the spill). It is clear that the time was also enough to
consider alternative countermeasures at sea or trying to protect some sensitive
resources along the 95 miles of shore line oiled. This delay and misperception
caused mortalities around 10,000 among water fowls. Shellfish areas on Vancouver
Island was at risk, so the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans closed two
shellfish areas to prevent possibly contaminated shel fish from reaching the market.

Case three: PATMOS

Name: Patmos
Spill Date 03/21/85
Straits of Messina, Sicily, Italy
Location: 38 15 N Latitude Longitude 015 35 E
Oil Product: Kirkuk Crude Oil
Tank Vessel
Oil quantity: 5300 Barrels

Incident Summary
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On March 21, 1985, the Patmos and the Castillo de Monte-Aragon collided in the
Straits of Messina. The Patmos was carrying 828,300 barrels of Kirkuk crude oil
while the Castillo de Monte-Aragon was in ballast. The Patmos caught fire and was
grounded on the beach of Villagio Torre Faro, Sicily. Firefighters subsequently
towed the vessel off the beach to maneuver it for firefighting efforts. The fire was
extinguished on March 23, and the Patmos was brought to dock at Messina, Sicily.

Observations:

“Patmos” spilled about 5,300 barrels of Kirkuk crude oil in the narrow strait of
Messina which is known for variable currents. Oil moving south collected large
amounts of garbage and remained near the coast near Taormina. Dispersant
application was conducted in Messina on March 22 and 23. Operations were done
from a variety of vessels outfitted with spray booms or fire monitors. There was no
regular supervision by aircraft of the dispersant operations; hence a great deal of
dispersants was applied ineffectively. About five skimming vessels were deployed at
Messina, but also had little success in recovering oil because of the large amounts
of garbage the slick collected.

Case four: PEURTO RICAN

Name Puerto Rican
Spill Date 10/31/84
San Francisco Bay, California
Location: 37 30 N Latitude Longitude 123 02 W
Oil Product Lube Oil, Lube Oil Additives, Bunker Fuel
Tank Vessel
Oil quantity: 38500 Barrels

Incident Summary
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On October 31, 1984, at 0324, an explosion occurred on board the Tank Vessel
Puerto Rican outside the SanFrancisco Bay Entrance Channel. The vessel was
loaded with 91,984 barrels of lube oil and lube oil additives and 8,500 barrels of
bunker fuel. Two crewmen and the pilot from the vessel were thrown into the water
by the blast. The pilot and one crewman were recovered with serious burns. One
crewman remained missing and was presumed dead after an extensive search. The
explosion caused a relatively minor release of oil. Flames from the initial and
subsequent explosions shot as high as 1000 feet into the sky. The fires on board the
vessel were extinguished by late afternoon on November 1.

Following the explosion, the USCG On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) ordered the
vessel towed out of the vicinity of S.Francisco Bay. The intent of the order was to
minimize the potential for catastrophic environmental effect from a massive release
of oil. On the basis of trajectory forecasts, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) recommended that the vessel be towed to the vicinity of a
nearby ocean dumping site (37 32 N, 122 59 W). This position is at the continental
shelf break, 10 miles SE of the FarallonIslands. The ongoing firefighting and cooling
efforts were hampered as the vessel moved farther from shore.

The weather worsened on November 2, with seas as high as 16 feet and wind
speeds up to 35 knots. Salvage and inspection activities ceased for the day. On
November 3 at 0000, the Puerto Rican broke in two, releasing 25,000-35,000
barrels of its cargo and an undetermined amount of the 8,500 barrels of bunker fuel
onboard. The stern section sank one mile inside the boundary of the Point
Reyes/Farallon Islands National Marine Sanctuary, taking most of the 8,500 barrels
of bunker fuel with it.

Observations:

During the towing operation, oil was continuously leaking from the damaged vessel.
The On-Scene Commander (OSC) insisted to continue the tow operation to the
dumping site despite the adverse weather conditions encountered. The whole
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operation was not far from shore; however no attempt was made to enter a safe
haven to be able to contain the leaking oil and recover it. No estimation that the hull
of the vessel may not withstand these 16 feet high seas and these roaring winds.
The decision makers tried to use various types of skimmers in this weather but
obviously failed.

After the vessel broke-up the use of dispersants was finally approved (3 DAYS
DELAY) but the late dispersant application dispersed only an estimate of none to
20% only of the slick. At the oil impacted beaches from Bodega head to Salmon
creek, workers were unable to place containment and deflection booms across the
mouths of many of the bays due to the swift currents.

Case five: SANKO HARVEST

Name: Sanko Harvest
Spill Date 02/13/91
Esperance, Western Australia
Location: 34 10 S Latitude Longitude 122 30 E
Oil Product: Fuel Oil
Non-Tank Vessel
Oil quantity: 4400 Barrels

Incident Summary:

On the night of February 13, 1991, the Panamanian bulk cargo carrier Sanko
Harvest grounded on a submerged rock pinnacle 23 miles south of Esperance,
Western Australia. The vessel, out of the shipping lane at the time of the incident,
was loaded with 30,000 metric tons of fertilizer, phosphate, and triple super
phosphate. The double hull of the vessel was ripped open in the grounding and the
freighter began leaking its fuel oil. On February 18, the ship broke in two in a storm
and sank with its entire cargo and bunker fuel. Approximately 3,500 barrels of fuel
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oil were spilled during the incident. The remaining 900 barrels of oil sank with the
ship.

Observations:

The spill created a slick approximately 9 miles long and 1000 feet wide. The
department of marine and harbors (DMH) deployed nearly 1,700 feet of containment
boom around the ship in two rows. The sea and wind conditions at the time were
very rough. More than two thirds of the boom was damaged at sea and lost.
The failure of the containment operation resulted in the heavy oiling of about 17
miles of the north east islands and the mainland of Australia with around 2,100
barrels of fuel oil. The sensitive beach of Cape Le Grande National Park was also
contaminated. Around 200 seal pups were reportedly dead on hood island and seal
rock. An unknown number of birds were also killed as a result of the spill.

Case six: SEA SPIRIT

Name: Sea Spirit
Spill Date 08/06/90
Strait of Gibraltar
Location: 35 53 N Latitude Longitude 005 58 W
Oil Product: Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO)
Tank Vessel
Oil quantity: 48875 Barrels

Incident Summary

On the evening of August 6, 1990, the Cypriot tanker “Sea Spirit” and the Norwegian
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) carrier “Hesperus” collided in the Strait of Gibraltar.
The Sea Spirit was holed on the starboard side above and below the waterline,
causing approximately 48,875 barrels of oil to be spilled into the Mediterranean Sea.
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Estimates of the total volume spilled ranged from 48,875 to 89,426 barrels. The
bows of the Hesperus were destroyed, but the vessel was still capable of sailing and
did not leak any of her cargo.

Prevailing currents drew the oil into the Mediterranean Sea. The oil was caught in
the flow of a clockwise gyre between Morocco and Spain and made approximately
two to three revolutions in the gyre over the following week, breaking up and
dispersing naturally. As the main body of the oil moved in the gyre, it passed within
a few miles of the Moroccan coast, near Punta de los Frailes.

The oil spread out with extensive sheen due to the warm, calm conditions at the
time. Sheen and large patches of emulsified oil were visible from over flights, and
reported by fishermen and observers in vessels in the waters off the coast.

Oil began to come ashore on the coasts of Spain and Morocco within a few days of
the spill. The Moroccan province of Al Hoceim was the hardest hit area. The first
impacts here were on August 13. Large slicks were observed in the bay and in
nearby offshore areas of Al Hoceim. Most of the oiling along the Moroccan coastline
consisted of a band of tar balls between two- and six feet wide. With the exception
of a few sites, this band was nearly continuous for the approximately 600 kilometers
of Moroccan coastline.

Observations:

Slicks were monitored and tracked as they neared the coast lines of Spain and
Morocco. Although heavy fuel oil is known to be resistant to chemical dispersants,
Spanish authorities actually used them but with very little success. Precautionary
booming was used at tourist beaches in Al Hoceim but was reportedly not effective
because the personnel on-scene did not have adequate training or experience to
install or tend them properly. When the oil was reported to impact remote areas on
the coasts of Spain, a very late request was sent to France, which contributed, by
sending a monitoring aircraft. This aircraft was equipped with side loop airborne
radar (SLAR) which was vitally needed since the beginning of the spill. (Arrived 4
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days late). The spill occurred during the height of the tourist season along both the
Spanish and Moroccan coast lines. There was a severe impact to the tuna fishing
industry in morocco. Fishermen reported 70 to 80 percent reduction in their catches.

Case seven: TANIO

Name: Tanio
Spill Date 03/07/80
Brittany, France
Location: 49 10 N Latitude Longitude 004 16 W
Oil Product No. 6 Fuel Oil
Tank Vessel
Oil quantity: 98955 Barrels

Incident Summary

On March 7, 1980, the tanker Tanio, carrying 190,580 barrels of No. 6 fuel oil, broke
in two off the coast of Brittany, France during a violent storm. The master and seven
crew members died as a result of the accident. Approximately 98,955 barrels of oil
spilled into the sea as a result of the breakup. The bow section, which still contained
36,650 barrels of oil, sank in 300 feet of water. Substantial amounts of oil continued
to leak from the sunken bow until several small leaks in the bow were sealed in May.
The stern remained afloat and was towed to the port of Le Havre where its
remaining 54,975 barrels of oil were offloaded.

Strong northwest winds at the time of the incident moved the oil towards the Breton
coast. Due to the high viscosity of the oil and severe weather conditions,
containment or dispersal at sea was impossible. Because the spring tides in this
region have an average tidal range of 26 feet, many areas along the coast could not
be boomed effectively. Consequently, the Breton coast (which had already received
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major oil impacts from the Torrey Canyon spill in 1967 and the Amoco Cadiz in
1978), was again severely oiled. Approximately 45percent of the Amoco Cadiz spill
area was affected by oil from the Tanio. Approximately 125 miles of the coastline of
the two Departments of Finistere and Cotes-du-Nord were oiled.

Observations:

Ten priority areas were boomed & monitored. Strong currents generated by the
large tidal range reduced the effectiveness of the booms, requiring the use of
another stronger type of boom that took several days to deploy. At river estuaries an
attempt was made to use vacuum systems, but did not work well because the hoses
became blocked with stones and sea weed. The oil was also so viscous in cold days
that the tractor- drawn vacuum trucks could not handle. In beach cleaning process
the extensive use of bulldozers and front-end loaders pushed the oil to underlying
sediments at a number of beaches. This sub-surface oiling required extensive
restoration work to clean.

Case eight: ELENI V

Name: Eleni V
Spill Date 05/06/78
Norfolk, southeast coast of England
Location: 52 49 N Latitude Longitude 001 48 E
Oil Product Heavy Fuel Oil
Tank Vessel
Oil quantity: 52500 Barrels

Incident Summary

On the morning of May 6, 1978, the Greek tanker “Eleni V” was cut in two by the
French vessel “Roseline” in foggy conditions off the southeast coast of England. The
Eleni V was loaded with 117,280 barrels of Heavy Fuel Oil. The collision caused the
release of approximately 52,500 barrels of oil. The aft section was towed to
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Rotterdam by five Dutch tugs. The cargo remaining in the aft section was recovered
by pumping it into storage tanks at Europort. The forward section of the vessel
drifted away from the collision site. It went aground on May 8 on a sandbank near
Lowestoft off the East Anglian coast with approximately 8000 barrels still on board.
Attempts to salvage the forward part failed, and authorities decided to blow it up.
The bow was towed to a position several miles offshore and blown up with two tons
of explosives by Navy divers on May 30. Following the explosion, a large part of the
remaining oil burned.

The heavy fuel oil had a viscosity of 5,000 centistokes at 20 degrees C. It formed a
huge viscous slick that was brown to black in color. Oil washed ashore on the
English and Dutch coasts. Oil on the shoreline formed pancakes between 0.25 and
12 inches in diameter. Oil was also reported as globules of thick mousse that
appeared on the beaches. This became the worst case of marine pollution on the
English coast since theTorrey Canyon spill, more than 11 years earlier.

Observations:

Although it had been predicted early in the response that this particular type of oil
would not readily disperse. Nonetheless, 22 vessels were used over a period of
three weeks spraying chemical dispersants on the oil?! Nearly 240,000 gallons of
BP 1100D and Dasic LTD were used. The dispersant operation had virtually no
effect on the oil, and almost all of it went ashore anyway.

Case nine: KHARK 5

Name: Khark 5
Spill Date 12/19/89
400 miles north of Las Palmas, Canary Islands
Location: 34 32 N Latitude Longitude 099 34 W
Oil Product Iranian Heavy crude oil
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Tank Vessel
Oil quantity: 452400 Barrels

Incident Summary

On December 19, 1989, the Iranian tanker Khark 5 bound for refineries in Northern
Europe exploded and caught fire approximately 400 miles north of the Canary
Islands. An estimated 452,400 barrels (19 million gallons) of the 1,714,300 barrels
(72 million gallons) on board spilled into the sea. The 35 crew members were
rescued by the passing Soviet vessel Sarny.
Ocean currents carried the abandoned vessel south towards the Canary Islands. A
Moroccan Government Response Task Force consisting of members from the
Moroccan Royal Navy, Interior Ministry, Ministry of Fisheries, and the Civil Defense
Force responded to the incident. According to a joint Spain/Morocco contingency
plan, the Spanish government was prepared to provide aid if necessary. The
Moroccan government sent a formal request to the U.S. Coast Guard for technical
assistance in evaluating the situation.

An Atlantic Strike Team (AST) representative was sent to the scene on January 4,
1990. The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF) provided
cleanup equipment and an on-scene advisor. Smit Tak, a Dutch salvage company,
repaired a 60 foot by 90 foot hole in the vessel's port side. Early efforts to tow the
damaged vessel away from the shore were hampered by 8-foot waves and high
winds. On January 1, a tug secured a line to the Khark 5 and began towing the
vessel towards the Madeira Islands off Portugal as Morocco and Spain refused to
allow the vessel close to their shores.

Observations:

During this combating operation, approximately 6,600 gallons of chemical
dispersants were applied to the floating oil in the first week of January (two weeks
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after the spill?!). Over 1,500 gallons of Finasol OSR-2, made from hydrocarbonbased solvents were applied in two passes by six aircraft with spraying equipment.
Another tug boat dispatched from Spain applied approximately 5,000 gallons of A-3
dispersants closer to shore. These dispersants were relatively ineffective, as they
were applied after the oil had weathered.

Case ten: MEGA BORG

Name: Mega Borg
Spill Date 06/08/90
Gulf of Mexico, 57 miles southeast of Galveston, Texas
Location: 28 33 N Latitude Longitude 094 08 W
Oil Product Angolan Palanca crude oil
Tank Vessel
Oil quantity: 100000 Barrels

Incident Summary

On June 8, 1990 at approximately 2330, while the Italian tank vessel “Fraqmura”
was lightering the Norwegian tank vessel Mega Borg, an explosion occurred in the
pump room of the Mega Borg. The two ships were in the Gulf of Mexico, 57 miles
southeast of Galveston Texas in international waters, but within the U.S. exclusive
economic zone. As a result of the explosion, a fire started in the pump room and
spread to the engine room.
An estimated 100,000 barrels of Angolan Palanca crude was burned or released
into the water from the Mega Borg during the next seven days. Approximately 238
barrels of oil was discharged when the Fraqmura intentionally broke away from the
Mega Borg. Explosions on the Mega Borg, caused the stern of the ship began to
settle lower in the water and list to the port side. A continuous discharge of burning
oil flowed over the aft port quarter of the ship. Less than an hour after the explosions
on the Mega Borg, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) in Galveston dispatched two
USCG cutters to the scene.
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Observations:

Responders believed that abnormally high freshwater runoff from the Sabine River
and other rivers in the area would have a tendency to keep the oil offshore. Initially
the oil moved northwest toward Corpus Christi. By June 18, the leading edge of the
oil slick approached the environmentally sensitive area of Sabine Pass, but was kept
offshore by winds and currents. After a few days it began to move to the north and
east and first came ashore on the Southwestern Louisiana coast on June 28 in the
form of small tar balls scattered over a distance of 18 miles. Shorelines that suffered
oiling included Holly Beach and Dung Beach in Texas, Peveto Beach in Louisiana,
and the Mermentau River in Louisiana.

On June 10, four thousand gallons of Exxon Corexit 9527 were applied to part of the
slick. Observers noted a definite change in the consistency of the oil slick after
dispersant application but with very limited dispersion ratio. Following this another
attempt was made with five aircraft sorties spraying a total of 11,300 gallons of
dispersant. The results were still not prominent. It should be noted that the winds
were very calm during & after the application which may not have provided enough
mixing energy for maximum dispersion.

Conclusion:
It is apparent that many decision-makers have an oversimplified view in many areas
and they are:
•

The fate of oil in the marine environment.

•

The physical and chemical characteristics of oil.

•

The movement of oil on the water.

•

The window of opportunity for dispersants.

•

The limitations of various mechanical countermeasures.

•

The remote sensing data and its role.

•

The hull resistance damaged tank vessels.
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The above mentioned problem areas are observed to have re-occurred along from
the 70s till recent spills (e.g. ERIKA & PRESTIGE). In fact the author on purpose did
not discuss those two major accidents as the media has done the job. However
reading the final reports of both spills shows that the same mistakes are made again.
This conclusion opened the door for many questions: Are those problems due to
limited knowledge or incompetence in handling the crisis situation? Why do we keep
applying massive amounts of dispersants while the oil is already weathered and
non-dispersable anymore? Why do mistakes still occur about the movement of oil
with the existence of trajectory models? Why are booms still used in fast flowing
waters for containment and deflection purposes when they are liable to be damaged
and lost without any benefit? Why do we lose precious time and money in deploying
countermeasures, which sometimes are known to be ineffective in this particular
spill? Why is the issue of pumping viscous oils not always considered and the whole
recovery operation fails? Why is the remote sensing data not utilized properly to aid
in quantifying the potential risks? Why do seal pups, birds, fisheries and tourist
businesses have to pay every time a spill occurs?
This study tries to answer some of these questions in an attempt to provide a
decision support tool for oil spill decision makers.

The cases studied were mainly selected from a book published by NOAA
in September 1992 with the title of “oil spill case histories 1967 – 1991:
summaries of significant U.S and international spills”.
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APPENDIX TWO
QUESTIONNAIRE

This questionnaire is a part of research work seeking for better ways of providing
information to decision makers who have to respond to oil spills. I am interested
in your views regarding these issues. So your responses will be most helpful if
you answer directly without referring to any material.
Please note that this is anonymous. No one is going to grade the results. None
of the questions are designed to be tricky; many of the questions do not have a
“right” or “wrong” answer. The answers will be analyzed on the basis of groups
of decision makers. Results from your questionnaire will be kept strictly
confidential.
The first section is related to oil spills in the marine environment unless stated
otherwise.
The second section is related to oil spill management simulators (OSMS) unless
stated otherwise.

(For section one)
•

The percentages mentioned represent the correct answers at the correct end
of the scale (e.g. True or maybe True, if the correct answer was true).

•

The correct answers are in Bold.

•

The response rate was 38 / 80 or 47.5%.

•

All figures are approximated.

•

One person represents about 2.6 % of the sample.

•

Data collected starting from July 2002 until August 2003.

“Result analysis is at the end of the Questionnaire”

SECTION ONE:
1. Crude oils are often difficult to disperse chemically more than 10 hours after
the spill.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false (correct 70%)
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2. Oil spilled on water tends to spread uniformly (horizontally in all directions at
the same rate).
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false (correct 50%)

3. Under optimal conditions, chemical dispersants can remove over 60% of the
oil from the ocean surface.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false (correct 50%)

4. As oil weathers, its dispersability decreases rapidly.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false (correct 80%)

5. Recovery of over 25% of spilled oil is common with mechanical response
options.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false (correct 30%)

6. Immediately after correct application, concentrations of dispersants in the top
few meters of water may be high enough to cause lethal or sublethal effects
on some organisms.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false (correct 40%)

7. Evaporated oil oxidizes into environmentally safe compounds.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false (correct 20%)

8. If the spilled oil’s pour point is higher than the water temperature, dispersants
are likely to be effective.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false (correct 30%)

9. Within the normal range of operating dosage, ecological effects are due
primarily to the dispersed oil, not the dispersant.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false

(correct 50%)

10. Assuming there are no strong currents or tides, wind will cause an oil spill to
drift at a velocity equal to 3-4% of the wind speed.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false
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(correct 90%)

11. Accurate predicting of the trajectory of a specific oil spill can be done by
using the latest computer models.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false

(correct 80%)

12. Dispersants should be tested on a small area of the spill before they are
applied to an entire spill.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false (no specific answer)

13. Booms can be effective in containing spilled oil in currents up to 4 knots.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false

(correct 40%)

14. Reserve buoyancy of a boom is the prime factor affecting its performance.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false

(correct 30%)

15. Oil emulsion viscosity may raise up to 1000 times the original spilled oil
viscosity.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false

(correct 60%)

16. The in-situ burning process of oil spills can be enhanced by using emulsion
breakers.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false

(correct 20%)

17. Entrainment (escape) of oil under a boom occurs with higher rate in
emulsified oils rather than in fresh ones.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false

(no specific answer)

18. Bio-degradation of physically and /or chemically dispersed oil is a minor
mechanism for the elimination of petroleum pollutants from the marine
environment.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false
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(correct 40%)

19. Photolysis (breakdown due to exposure to UV) of physically and/or
chemically dispersed oil is a minor mechanism for the elimination of
petroleum pollutants from the marine environment.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false

(correct 30%)

20. “Effective” dispersant use implies that a minimum of 50% of oil has been
removed from the ocean surface.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false (no specific answer)

21. Some oil sorbent materials are listed among hazardous substances in many
countries.
True---maybe true---don’t know---maybe false---false

(correct 50%)

SECTION TWO:
•

The response rate for this section was 27 / 50 or 54%.

•

All figures are approximated.

•

One person represents about 3.7 % of the sample.

•

Data collected starting from May until August 2003.

•

Numbers from 1-3 are considered on the ineffective-not true-disagree side.

•

Numbers from 5-7 are considered on the effective-true-agree side.

•

The number 4 is considered either hybrid or the participant simply does not
know any answer.

1. How effective are oil spill management simulators (OSMSs) for training on
the following topics:- (please circle your answer)
a) Communications in a team?
Very effective

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

very ineffective

(Effective side 90%--- hybrid 0%---ineffective side 10%)

b) Technical skills?
Very effective

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

very ineffective

(Effective side 80%--- hybrid 0%---ineffective side 20%)
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c) Emergency procedures?
Very effective

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

very ineffective

(Effective side 60%--- hybrid 20%---ineffective side 20%)

d) Coping with stress?
Very effective

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

very ineffective

(Effective side 10%--- hybrid 70%---ineffective side 20%)

e) Leadership qualities?
Very effective

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

very ineffective

(Effective side 40%--- hybrid 40%---ineffective side 20%)

f)

General teamwork?
Very effective

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

very ineffective

(Effective side 40%--- hybrid 30%---ineffective side 70%)

g) Early error detection?
Very effective

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

very ineffective

(Effective side 30%--- hybrid 50%---ineffective side 20%)

2. To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding the
effectiveness of oil spill management simulators?

a) For a simulator to be effective it is important to establish that the trainee has
better performance than before he or she started the training with the
simulator.
Very true

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Not at all true

(True side 10%---hybrid 40%---not true side 50%)

b) For a simulator to be effective it is important to establish that the trainee has
better performance following use of the simulator than she or he would have
had using a different method (e.g. lecture or text book)
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Very true

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Not at all true

(True side 60%---hybrid 20%---not true side 20%)

c) For a simulator to be effective it is important to establish that the trainee has
better knowledge than before she or he started the training with the simulator.
Very true

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Not at all true

(True side 20%---hybrid 0%---not true side 80%)

d) For a simulator to be effective it is important to establish that the trainee has
better knowledge following use of the simulator than she or he would have
had using a different method (e.g. lecture or text book).
Very true

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Not at all true

(True side 20%---hybrid 10%---not true side 70%)

e) For a simulator to be effective it is important that the trainee has better skills
than before she or he started the training with the simulator.
Very true

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Not at all true

(True side 70%---hybrid 20%---not true side 10%)

f)

For a simulator to be effective it is important to establish that the trainee has
better skills following use of the simulator than she or he would have had
using a different method (e.g. lecture or text book).
Very true

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Not at all true

(True side 20%---hybrid 0%---not true side 80%)

3. To what extent do you agree with each of these statements: -

a) Individuals trained using simulators have a better standard of training than
those without training on simulators.
Totally agree

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

totally disagree

(Agree side 80%---hybrid 0%---disagree side 20%)
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b) Some individuals benefit a great deal more than others when being trained
on simulators.
Totally agree

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

totally disagree

(Agree side 70%---hybrid 0%---disagree side 30%)

c) The usefulness of a simulator usually outweighs the cost of a simulator.
Totally agree

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

totally disagree

(Agree side 60%---hybrid 20%---disagree side 20%)

d) Most decision makers feel they learned a great deal more on simulators than
By using other methods.
Totally agree

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

totally disagree

(Agree side 80%---hybrid 10%---disagree side 10%)

Result Analysis: (Section one)

-The questions in section one are divided into general oil spill knowledge
questions (e.g. questions 1 to 6) and more technical questions (e.g. questions 7,
8 & 16).

- The highest percentage of correct answers obviously was in the general oil spill
knowledge questions with a decreasing trend as the questions got more
technical. However an exception was detected regarding question number 13,
where 70% of the participants had the perception that Booms could contain oil in
current rates up to 4 knots which is totally wrong even in optimum deployment
conditions.

- The average percentage of correct answers for the general oil spill knowledge
questions (questions: 1-2-3-4-5-6-9-10-11-13 &21) was 49%. This clearly
indicates that almost half of the participants still have limited knowledge about
general information about oil spills and countermeasures.

- The average percentage of correct answers for the more technical questions
(questions: 7-8-14-16-18 & 19) was only 28% which further indicates the lack of
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adequate technical knowledge about fate of oil spills and the validity of various
countermeasures.

- Questions which do not have specific answers (questions: 12-17 & 20) were
answered either on the true or false side. However neither of the participants
circled the “do not know” answer, which may indicate the tendency of oil spill
decision makers to build up their own perceptions (which could be wrong) on
some issues or a certain countermeasure.

- Another observation was the very low percentage of correct answers when the
issue was related to a new applied technology (e.g. question 16). About 70% of
the participants answered “do not know” which could indicate that the knowledge
of such personnel needs continuous upgrading and familiarization with the latest
trends in spill combating technologies.

- In the light of the above mentioned results (combined with observations from
the cases studied) the author decided to investigate some of these technical
aspects which produced the lowest percentage of correct answers in this
questionnaire. Chapters two, three and four of this study are an attempt to clarify
some of the indistinct technical areas which constitutes a vital pre-requisite to a
more sound decision in oil spill crisis management.

Result Analysis (Section Two)

The questions in this section were initially meant to verify whether decision
makers can differentiate between knowledge and competence issues in relation
to oil spill combating. The questions also try to sense oil spill current and
potential decision-makers (DMs) perceptions about using Oil Spill Management
Simulators (OSMSs) in building up combating skills in the lack of field training.

There was consensus among DMs about the effectiveness of OSMSs in the
areas of enhancing technical skills and communication in a team. However DMs
remained skeptical about the ability of such simulators to provide the necessary
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levels of stress in training environments, or their role in enhancing teamwork
skills.

There seem to be clear miss-understanding among DMs about the actual role of
OSMSs. Most participants valued the simulator training approach in comparison
to other means of obtaining knowledge, which is quite misleading. OSMSs
should be assessed as a stand alone means of training (if available) as they
mainly contribute in enhancing competence not knowledge.

DMs agreed that simulators in-general provide a high standard training tool and
this could prove valid for training on oil spill crisis management. DMs also
agreed that OSMSs usefulness for trainees outweighs their establishment
expenses.

In the light of the above results the author decided to investigate the process of
building up a sound decision and the outstanding training issues needed in
chapters four and five of this study. This investigation is also meant to introduce
such new training approach for oil spill decision makers and fill the identified
gaps in their competence levels while handling oil spills.

This questionnaire and the correct answers were compiled from the following
sources in addition to interviews carried out during field studies.
-

-

-

Scientific and Environmental Associates, (1997). Ecological issues on
dispersant use: decision-makers perceptions and information needs.
Alexandria, VA.
American petroleum institute, (1986). The Role of Chemical
Dispersants in Oil Spill Control. American Petroleum Institute:
Washington, DC.
National Research Council, (1985). Oil in the Sea, Inputs, Fates and
Effects. National Research Council: Washington, DC.
Haberley,J., Barnett,M. & Gatfield, D. (2001). Simulator training for
handling and escalating emergencies. MCA. SouthHampton.
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Appendix Three
Field Studies Related to this Research

A.3.1 introduction

This appendix lists all the oil spill related institutes, factories or organizations visited
during the field studies program of WMU. In each of these visits the author
established communication with the spill responsible staff, either related to
management of spill response, training of responders or manufacturing of training
and combating equipment and software. Some personnel were interviewed and
some agreed to answer the questionnaire (see appendix 5) but almost all stressed
on their anonymity.

A.3.2 List of the visits

A.3.2.1 Norwegian Maritime Directorate in Oslo (Norway)
Date: 2nd. September 2002
The Environment Protection department staff was interviewed about the existing
spill organization in cases of major spills to have an overall idea about the chain of
command and the background of personnel involved in this organizational structure.

A.3.2.2 Det Norske Veritas (DNV) head quarters at Hovik (Norway)
Date: 3rd. September 2002
The certification staff was interviewed about the class surveys relating to hull
integrity and how this could contribute in the future avoidance of major spills.

A.3.2.3 The Norwegian State Pollution Control Authority in Horten (Norway)
Date: 4th. September 2002
The staff delivered a briefing about the preparedness of this organization against
acute pollution cases. They were later interviewed about the competence levels and
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expertise of members of command and control in cases of major spills. Some staff
agreed to answer the questionnaire.

A.3.2.4 The Norwegian Ship owners’ Association in Oslo (Norway)
Date: 5th. September 2002
The staff delivered a briefing about the role of such non-governmental organization
(NGO) in environmental protection, later they were interviewed on their technical or
financial support to other NGO’s in developing countries to upgrade their ability to
combat major oil spills.

A.3.2.5 M/V Gunnar Thorson ( Denmark)
Date: 26 th. September 2002
A small scale exercise to demonstrate the deployment of booms and skimmers in
the Oresund by the Danish oil-spill combating staff. Some of the officers and crew
were interviewed and one officer agreed to answer the questionnaire.

A.3.2.6 ChemControl and Ro-Clean Desmi (Denmark)
Date: 27 th. September 2002

ChemControl is a chemical treatment plant, while Ro-Clean Desmi is a giant
manufacturer for spill combating equipment (booms, skimmers, transfer pumps etc.).
Some technical staff were interviewed about the research and development projects
in-progress and how are they endeavoring to enhance the efficiency of their
products. One of the training staff also answered the questionnaire.

A.3.2.7 Danish Maritime Authority (Copenhagen)
Date: 17 th. November 2002
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The DMA was visited; some oil spill management and training personnel delivered
some lectures and was later interviewed by the author about decision-making
strategies in cases of major oil spills. Some also agreed on answering the
questionnaire.

A.3.2.8 Tanker terminal in Kalundborg (Denmark)
Date: 18 th. March 2003
The terminal spill combating facilities were thoroughly studied and the pier Master
was interviewed on procedures of crisis communication in cases of major spills.

A.3.2.9 Germanischer Lloyd, Head Office in Hamburg (Germany)
Date: 3rd. March 2003
Interviewed the classification society staff on their role in certifying local, regional
and international spill combating organization and how do they contribute in
promoting the standards of oil spill decision-makers.

A.3.2.10 Finnish Maritime Administration (FMA) in Helsinki (Finland)
Date:1st. To 3rd. April 2003
Various personnel in the environment section were interviewed in this lengthy visit
on their views and opinions about the adequacy of the levels of training delivered to
the spill combating and organizational staff in Finland and the role of the training
institutes in this process.

A.3.2.10 Maritime and Coast Guard Agency (MCA) in Southampton (UK)
Date: 27 th. May 2003
The central command center for handling oil spills in UK was situated in the same
room. An interview was conducted with the counter pollution staff head on the
training and competence issues of staff. The co-operation between MCA and the Oil
Spill Response Limited (OSRL) was described as an example of successful links
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with NGOs. The command centre communication facilities were described by
responsible staff and a briefing about technical facilities was delivered. Many of the
staff agreed to answer the questionnaire and some copies were sent to OSRL as
well.

A.3.2.11 International Maritime Organization (London)
Date: 30 th. May 2003
The Technical Co-operation Division staff was interviewed about the role of IMO in
providing vitally needed training courses in developing countries for spill combating
and management staff. The interviews was extended also to some delegates and
representatives of NGOs attending the MSC 77 plenary sessions in an attempt to
verify the various views relating to training and competence of oil spill decision
makers in various countries.
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Appendix Four
Dispersant Effectiveness Measurements

Dispersant effectiveness is defined as the amount of oil that the dispersant puts into the
water column versus that which remains on the surface. The results of these tests show
the typical trends of decrease in effectiveness with weathering. One of the main findings
of these extensive laboratory tests is that: this pattern of effectiveness decrease with
increased weathering is oil specific and does not correlate with simple oil properties such
as density, viscosity or maximum weathering conditions

Results of Recent Dispersant Effectiveness Measurements
Oil

Dispersant Effectiveness % Std. Dev.

Adgo

Corexit 9500

28.6

9.1

AEA Medium

Corexit 9500

47.8

2.0

AEA Medium

Corexit 9527

54.1

2.9

AEA Medium

Dasic Slickg.

48.7

4.9

Alaska North Slope

Corexit 9500

46.1

6.9

Alberta Sweet Mixed Blend

Corexit 9500

40.0

6.3

Alberta Sweet Mixed Blend

Corexit 9527

29.9

5.9

Alberta Sweet Mixed Blend

Enersperse700 22.5

4.0

Alberta Sweet Mixed Blend

Oriclean

1.1

1.0

Arabian Heavy (2000)

Corexit 9500

15

Arabian Light

Corexit 9500

21.4

2.0

Arabian Light 12.04% Weathered Corexit 9500

17.2

0.6

Arabian Light 24.20% Weathered Corexit 9500

13.6

0.1

Arabian Medium

Corexit 9500

22.7

1.0

Arabian Medium 13.15% Weath. Corexit 9500

17.2

0.3
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Oil

Dispersant Effectiveness % Std Dev.

Dos Cuadras 11.17% Weathered Corexit 9500

15.4

2.7

Dos Cuadras 11.17% Weathered Corexit 9527

8.2

3.4

Dos Cuadras 11.17% Weathered Dasic LTS

8.0

0.3

Dos Cuadras 11.17% Weathered Enersperse700 10.4

1.2

Dos Cuadras 20.30% Weathered Corexit 9500

6.9

0.3

Dos Cuadras 20.30% Weathered Enersperse700 2.3

1.6

Empire

Corexit 9500

31.4

3.4

Eugene Island Block 32

Corexit 9500

17.9

2.3

Eugene Island Block 32

Corexit 9500

45.4

6.7

Eugene Island Block 32

Corexit 9500

44.4

2.3

Eugene Island Block 32

Corexit 9500

44

Eugene Is B. (13 % weathered)

Corexit 9500

22

Eugene Is B. (20% weathered)

Corexit 9500

18

Eugene Island B. (6% weathered)Corexit 9500

30

Eugene Island Block 43

Corexit 9500

2

Federated

Corexit 9500

39.0

54

Federated

Corexit 9527

20.4

2.5

Federated

Dasic LTS

19.3

3.0

Federated

Enersperse700 15.1

1.1

Federated 15.5% Weathered

Corexit 9500

38.3

2.2

Federated 15.5% Weathered

Enersper 700 12.6

1.s

Federated 28.5% Weathered

Corexit 9500

21.6

4.1

Federated 28.5% Weathered

Corexit 9527

4.0

1.4

Federated 28.5% Weathered

Dasic LTS

9.4

1.s

Federated 28.5% Weathered

Enersper 700 2.5

0.3
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Oil

Dispersant Effectiveness % Std. Dev.

Granite Point

Enersper 700 27.3

3.1

Granite Point 45.3% Weathered Corexit 9500

13.9

4.2

Green Canyon Block 184

Corexit 9500

47.2

4.5

G.C.B.184 12.12% Weathered

Corexit 9500

33.0

30

G.C.B.184 26.03% Weathered

Corexit 9500

25.2

2.0

G.C.B.184 38.21% Weathered

Corexit 9500

22.4

3.0

Hebron M-04

Corexit 9500

<10

Hebron M-04 (9% weathered)

Corexit 9500

<10

Hebron M-04 (16% weathered)

Corexit 9500

<10

Hebron M-04 (23% weathered)

Corexit 9500

<10

Hibemia (1999)

Corexit 9500

21

Hibemia (1999) (10% weathered) Corexit 9500

17

Hibernia (1999) (20% weathered) Corexit 9500

15

Hibemia (1999) (32% weathered) Corexit 9500

11

High Viscosity Fuel Oil

Corexit 9500

0.0

0.0

Hondo

Corexit 9500

8.3

13

Hondo

Enersper 700 4.0

1.6

Hondo 12.38% Weathered

Corexit 9500

0.0

0.0

Hondo 12.38% Weathered

Corexit 9527

0.0

0.0

Hondo 12.38% Weathered

Dasic LTS

0.0

0.0

Hondo 12.38% Weathered

Enersper 700 0.0

0.0

Hondo 16.7% Weathered

Corexit 9500

6.3

5.0

Hondo 29.76% Weathered

Corexit 9500

0.0

0.0

Hondo 29.76% Weathered

Corexit 9527

0.0

0.0

Hondo 29.76% Weathered

Dasic LTS

0.0

0.0

Hondo 29.76% Weathered

Enersper 700 0.0

0.0

Hondo 32.2% Weathered

Corexit 9500

1.0
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4.3

Port Hueneme 4.16% Weathered Dasic LTS

2.3

0.9

Port Hueneme 4.16% Weathered Enersper700

4.0

0.7

Port Hueneme 6.37% Weathered Corexit 9500

1.9

1.3

Port Hueneme 6.37% Weathered Corexit 9500

6.2

4.0

Port Hueneme 6.37% Weathered Dasic LTS

1.0

0.8

Port Hueneme 6.37% Weathered Enersper 700 6.8

2.6

Prudhoe Bay

Corexit 9500

17.9

3.3

Prudhoe Bay 18% Weathered

Corexit 9500

2.5

5.6

Prudhoe Bay 27% Weathered

Corexit 9500

0.0

0.0

Sakhalin

Corexit 9500

83.9

4.3

Sakhalin

Corexit 9527

78.5

5.1

Sakhalin 25.04 % Weathered

Corexit 9500

48.5

7.9

Sakhalin 45.19 % Weathered

Corexit 9500

31.0

0.8

=======================================================================

Source of this data was a paper presented to the 2001 Arctic and Marine Oil
Spill Program (AMOP) Technical Seminar by : Merv Fingas, Ben Fieldhouse,
Lise Sigouin, Zhendi Wang and Joseph V.Mullin.
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Appendix Five
The Incident Command System
A.5.1 introduction
This appendix briefly describes the components and structure of the incident
command system (ICS) and how can it be introduced in training oil spill decision
makers.
A.5.2 Organization structure
The following out line of the full ICS system is illustrated in fig. A.5.1

Fig.A.1 Full Incident Command Organizational chart
This full structure is mainly applicable to major spills on the national or international
level, but it could be modified according to the scope and severity of each oil spill
case. For training purposes the decision makers should be assigned the following
duties (see fig.A.2) in order to qualify a team capable of handling a spill crisis using
such command system.
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Oil Spill Commander
Assistant Spill
Commander
Planning
Section Chief
Planning Staff

Operations
Section Chief

Public Relations
Staff
Logistics
Section Chief

Assistant Operations

Operations Staff

Clean-up Vessels

Helicopter

Assistant Logistics

Finance/Administration
Section Chief
Finance/Adm Staff

Logistics Staff

Fig. A.5.2 proposed training posts for ICS system
A.5.3 Responsibilities of the Command Team
The following responsibilities are applicable to actual spill cases as well as during
simulated training exercises.
A.5.3.1 Incident Commander
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

Assess the situation
Determine Incident Objectives and strategy
Establish the immediate priorities
Establish an Incident Command Post
Establish an appropriate organization
Ensure planning meeting are scheduled as required
Approve and authorize the implementation of an Incident Action Plan
Ensure that adequate safety measures are in place
Coordinate activity for all Command and General Staff
Coordinate with key people and officials
Approve requests for additional resources or for the release of resources
Keep political powers informed of incident status
Approve the use of trainees, volunteers, and auxiliary personnel
Authorize release of information to the news media
Order the demobilization of the incident when appropriate
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A.5.3.2 Operations section Chief (On-scene Commander)
n
n
n
n
n

Contain the incident
Recover as much as possible
Treat when possible
Store and dispose the recovered products if there is any
Maintain Unit Log

A.5.3.3 Planning section Chief
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

Collect and process situation information about the incident (documentation)
Supervise preparation of the Incident Action Plan
Determine need for any specialized resources in support of the incident
Provide periodic predictions on incident potential
Collect current weather information
Demobilization at the end of the incident
Maintain Unit Log

A.5.3.3 Logistics section Chief
n Provide different types of transport
n Supply the operational team with
- Treatment products
- Working equipment
- Fuel and other materials
n Assure the repair and maintenance of equipment
n Provide personnel’s food and lodging
n Maintain Unit Log
A.5.3.4 Finance and Administration section Chief
n
n
n
n
n
n

Keep records of operations (forms)
Order for the necessary materials and equipment
Prepare subsequent indemnity files
Recruit reinforcements
Prepare assistance contracts
Maintain Unit Log

Finally it should be noted that this system can be also used by local response
organizations for combating minor spills by compacting the structure and modifying
the duties of the staff involved as needed.

The information in his appendix was compiled from the USCG publication titled
“Incident Management Hand Book” publication COMDTPUBP3120.17.
Published in 2001.
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